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Habeas and the Roberts Court
Aziz Z. Huq†
Postconviction habeas comprises about seven percent of federal district courts’
dockets and between eight and twenty percent of Supreme Court certiorari work.
Scholars of all stripes condemn habeas as an empty ‘charade’ lacking ‘coherent
form.’ They urge as a result root-and-branch transformation. Contra that consensus, this Article first advances a descriptive hypothesis that the Roberts Court’s
habeas jurisprudence is more internally coherent than generally believed—even if
its internal logic has to date escaped substantial scholarly scrutiny. The Article develops a stylized account of the Roberts Court’s recent jurisprudence as an instrument for sorting at the front end of litigation between cases warranting either less
or more judicial attention. This account suggests that the Roberts Court titrates
judicial attention by streaming cases into one of two channels via a diverse set of
procedural and substantive mechanisms. In Track One, petitioners obtain scanty
review and almost never prevail. In Track Two, by contrast, petitions receive more
serious consideration and have a more substantial (if hardly certain) chance of
success. This stylized account of the case law enables more focused investigation of
the values that the Roberts Court pursues through its current articulation of habeas doctrine—and this is the Article’s second task. Drawing on both doctrinal analysis and law-and-economics models of litigation, the Article explores several possible justifications for the Court’s observed bifurcated approach. Rejecting
explanations based on state-centered federalism values, sorting, and sentinel effects, the Article suggests that some conception of fault best fits the role of a central
organizing principle. This aligns habeas with constitutional tort law, suggesting a
previously unexamined degree of interdoctrinal coherence in the Roberts Court’s
attitude to discrete constitutional remedies. While the central aim of this Article is
positive and descriptive in character, it concludes by examining some normative
entailments of habeas’s persistence in a bifurcated state. Specifically, I suggest that
a better understanding of the Court’s fault-based logic casts skeptical light on existing reform proposals, and is at least consistent with the possibility that habeas
could still serve as a tool in some larger projects of criminal justice reform.
† Assistant Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Teaching Scholar,
University of Chicago Law School. I owe a large debt to the students of my Spring 2013
Federal Habeas Corpus course. All teachers should be fortunate enough to have students
as bright and thoughtful to clarify their muddy thinking. I am also grateful to Eric
Freedman, Jon Hafetz, Brandon Garrett, Lee Kovarsky, Eve Brensike Primus, Graham
Safty, Steve Vladeck, Mishan Wroe, and participants at a works-in-progress workshop at
American University, Washington College of Law, for terrific comments, and to Steven J.
Winkelman and Jessica Chung for their great research assistance. David King, Sean
Cooksey, and their fellow editors at the Review also did a superlative job. I am pleased to
acknowledge the support of the Frank Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund. All errors are mine
alone. This paper won the 2013 American Association of Law Schools (AALS) Section on
Criminal Justice Junior Scholars Paper Competition Award.
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INTRODUCTION
Like a guest lingering when the banquet has ended, postconviction habeas corpus persists as an obdurate and often unwelcome fixture of the federal-court docket.1 In the district
courts, 6.77 percent of cases filed in the year ending September
30, 2012, sought noncapital postconviction relief.2 At the Supreme Court, habeas also consumes a surprisingly large share of
judicial bandwidth. In October Term (O.T.) 2012, 8 percent of
the Court’s merits docket concerned habeas.3 In O.T. 2011, it
was 20 percent; in O.T. 2010, 10 percent.4 This persistence of
federal habeas review—even aside from its famously quirky doctrinal contours—is poorly explained by any obvious functional
benefit. To be sure, the state criminal justice systems producing
most challenged convictions remain deeply riven by serious constitutional flaws.5 Of these, perhaps the most embarrassing is
the states’ persistent failure to furnish or fund the effective assistance of counsel that is required by the Sixth Amendment.6
1
Federal courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
USC § 2241 and § 2254(a). Postconviction review for federal prisoners occurs under conditions defined primarily in 28 USC § 2255. Prisoners convicted in state court are governed by rules enunciated in 28 USC § 2254. See Brandon L. Garrett and Lee Kovarsky,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-Conviction Litigation 134 (Foundation 2013). This Article largely concerns challenges to state criminal convictions under
28 USC § 2254, which make up the lion’s share of Supreme Court jurisprudence and
which thereby determine the general trajectory of the doctrine.
2
In the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2012, a total of 18,851 noncapital habeas petitions were filed with the federal courts; 19,624 petitions were filed in
the twelve months before that. See U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by
Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2011 and 2012, *1, 3 (Administrative Office of the United States Courts 2012),
online
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/C02Sep12.
pdf (visited Dec 1, 2013). In the year ending September 30, 2011, 6.78 percent of cases
filed were habeas petitions. Id.
3
Stat Pack for October Term 2012 *6 (SCOTUSblog June 27, 2013), online at
http://scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT12.pdf
(visited Dec 1, 2013).
4
Stat Pack for October Term 2011 *6 (SCOTUSblog Sept 25, 2012), online at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_Updated1.pdf (visited Dec 1,
2013); Stat Pack for October Term 2010 *5 (SCOTUSblog June 28, 2011), online at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2013).
5
See Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Cal L Rev 1,
16–23 (2010) (documenting structural problems in state criminal justice systems).
6
This has been documented in a score of reports over the past decade. See, for example, Robert C. Boruchowitz, Malia N. Brink, and Maureen Dimino, Minor Crimes,
Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts *14–17 (Na-
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But patterns of federal habeas relief do not obviously reflect a
rational response to ongoing concerns with the state of criminal
justice systems. To the contrary, the Great Writ has been characterized as a cruel “charade” ending in a vanishingly small
chance of relief for petitioners.8 This is said to be particularly so
in noncapital cases, where, it is said, “habeas is completely ineffectual.”9 Not for the first time, a wave of commentary argues
that federal postconviction jurisdiction should be either largely
abolished10 or radically “modified.”11 Scholars who are sympathetic to federal habeas’s libertarian ends also characterize the
law of postconviction review as “confusing”12 and a “mess.”13
Even some of habeas’s most hard-core advocates acknowledge
intellectual confusion in the doctrine, and suggest instead a
need to “draw back, take stock, and set about reconstructing
federal habeas corpus in a sensible, coherent form.”14 If there is a
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Apr 2009), online at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (visited
Dec 1, 2013); National Right to Counsel Committee, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel *49–99 (Constitution Project Apr
2009), online at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (visited Nov 19, 2013);
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants,
Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice *7–28 (ABA Dec
2004),
online
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defenda
nts/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2013).
8
Joseph L. Hoffmann and Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State
Criminal Justice, 84 NYU L Rev 791, 816 (2009). Hoffmann and King have also articulated their argument in book form. Nancy J. King and Joseph L. Hoffmann, Habeas for
the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the Great Writ (Chicago
2011).
9
Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 793 (cited in note 7).
10 See id at 818–23. Their analysis has been powerfully challenged. See, for example, Eve Brensike Primus, Review, A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 Mich L Rev 887,
892–908 (2012) (noting conceptual incoherence and ineffectualness of reform proposals);
John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir M. Weyble, In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 Cornell L Rev 435, 439 (2011) (arguing that
Hoffmann and King’s assessment “underestimates the importance of rectifying cases of
horrendous error and rests on a set of assumptions that we believe do not comport with
the reality of contemporary postconviction litigation”).
11 Primus, 98 Cal L Rev at 26 (cited in note 5).
12 Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas after Pinholster, 53 BC L Rev 953, 959 (2012). See
also Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 Va L Rev 61, 80 (2011) (noting the “poor
drafting” of the habeas statute).
13 Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 887 (cited in note 10). See also Larry Yackle,
AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 329, 329 (2012) (invoking “the colossal mess
that federal habeas corpus has become”); Primus, 98 Cal L Rev at 12 (cited in note 5)
(describing habeas as “broken”).
14 Yackle, 24 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) at 333 (cited in note 13).
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common thread to commentary on the writ, in short, it is that
there is no common thread to the doctrine. The Court, all agree,
has made a hash of the law that only radical surgery can now
unravel.
In the half light of this crepuscular skepticism, the retail legal doctrine leaping like showers of sparks from the Supreme
Court’s anvil each year suffers comparative neglect.15 Such neglect is hardly benign when it comes to the blue-collar neighborhood of postconviction remedies.16 Habeas law is largely a product of the Supreme Court, rather than of Congress.17 Either the
statutory text tends to reflect principles and rules already specified in Supreme Court jurisprudence, or the congressional novation is so ambiguous, and so generative of circuit split, that it
might as well have been drafted as a delegation to the Court. In
my view, it is the pedestrian, piecemeal development of judicial
doctrine—more than statutes—that creates, allots, and eliminates opportunities for habeas relief.
Of course, judicial authorship of basic doctrinal structures is
no guarantee of coherence: Any body of judicially articulated
rules risks reflecting the ebb and flow of evolving coalitions of
justices, and hence is vulnerable to Arrovian cycling.18 And it is
no doubt possible to explain habeas’s labyrinthine, looped sequences of procedural and substantive gateways as exercises in
the doctrinal paradox.19

15 Important exceptions to this trend analyzing specific aspects of doctrine include
Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 953–54 (cited in note 12); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the
Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev 85, 98–104 (2012).
16 See Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86 Am Bankr L J 3, 3
(2012).
17 See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 Cornell L Rev 259,
262 (2006) (“While the Court maintains that the scope of the writ is primarily for Congress to determine, it does not, in my view, really believe that to be true. . . . [It] has assumed a fair share of the responsibility for determining the scope of habeas review, or
how much habeas is enough.”). There are, of course, important exceptions. The most important of these is the habeas statute of limitations enacted in 1996. Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, 1217,
codified at 28 USC § 2244(d)(1) (creating one-year statute of limitations).
18 The Arrovian paradox concerns the instability of collective decisions due to the
irreducible risk of cycling among outcomes. See Frank E. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv L Rev 802, 815–17, 823–31 (1982).
19 The doctrinal paradox arises when a collective forms a judgment on a single issue based on numerous sub-issues, and different ultimate results are obtained by a single all-or-nothing vote versus seriatim issue-by-issue voting over sub-issues. See Christian List, The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions, 24 Soc
Choice & Welfare 3, 4–5 (2005).
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Nevertheless, a retreat to social choice-infused cynicism is
unwarranted. The doctrine—at least in its major outlines rather
than its epicycles—may well have more of an internal coherence
logic and structure than is commonly supposed. The Justices, at
least, seem to think so. They find coherence in the serried crowd
of hobnailed habeas precedents. That conviction manifests, for
instance, in unanimous decisions, extending into O.T. 2013, in
which the Court, often acting per curiam, reversed habeas decisions (mostly grants of relief) from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals without briefing or oral argument.20 That is, the Justices’ views about the contents of the habeas playbook are so propinquitous that they are able routinely to jettison their own prohibition against treating the writ of certiorari as an exercise in
mere error correction.21 Plainly, such comfortable unanimity on
so divisive a Court reflects an uncommon consensus on habeas’s
normative goals, one that transcends ideological lines in form if
not in substance.
This Article offers an account of the Roberts Court’s habeas
jurisprudence. That description (which is also an effort at intellectual reconstruction of the doctrine) is offered here as a catalyst for clearer thinking about the postconviction writ’s purpose
and justification in the dimmed dusk of Warren Court judicial
liberalism. To that end, I aim to distill from recent case law a
concededly broad-brush synthesis of how judicial labor is organized and allocated in the postconviction context. I do not aim to
capture every detail of a very complex body of law. Caveat lector,
therefore: what follows is far less than a comprehensive, treatise-like account of the doctrine, but simply an attempt to capture its motive, immanent logic. Of necessity, moreover, my Supreme Court-focused account pays disproportionate attention to
those margins of the law that have received greater attention
from the apex tribunal of late. The Article’s threshold goal, I
should further underscore, is resolutely positive, not normative,
in character (although I shall endeavor to harvest some normative pickings from my account in closing).
20 See, for example, Ryan v Schad, 133 S Ct 2548 (2013) (per curiam); Nevada v
Jackson, 133 S Ct 1990 (2013) (per curiam); Marshall v Rodgers, 133 S Ct 1446 (2013)
(per curiam); Johnson v Williams, 133 S Ct 1088 (2013); Martel v Clair, 132 S Ct 1276
(2012); Greene v Fisher, 132 S Ct 38 (2011). All these cases are examples of per curiam
denials of habeas writ. For a rare instance of a per curiam decision in favor of a habeas
petitioner, see Porter v McCollum, 558 US 30 (2009).
21 Supreme Court Rule 10 makes clear that error correction is not ordinarily a
ground upon which the Court will grant a petition for a writ of certiorari.
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A central premise of my account is that federal judges in
habeas have developed doctrinal and jurisdictional tools to sort
at the front end of a case between those petitions that warrant
either more or less attention. This sorting is necessarily temporally antecedent to any decision as to whether relief should be
granted. Indeed, front-end sorting is useful precisely because it
allows judges to identify the cases to which they should attend
more closely in terms of the standards of review, the scope of evidentiary consideration, and the availability of any merits consideration at all. To a remarkable degree, the Justices have coalesced on a specific, bifurcated process for triaging
postconviction habeas petitions in this fashion. To describe that
process is necessarily to underscore some elements of the doctrine more than others. I thus do not address at length the concept of “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” which is infrequently involved with success.22 The complex body of law around
postconviction habeas’s statute of limitations also receives short
shrift here. In my view, although this body of case law is often
outcome determinative, especially in the complex circumstances
of capital litigation, it represents less an emanation of some
deeply felt judicial principle, than the Court’s necessary scrimmaging with a poorly drafted rule encountering a heterogeneous
set of external circumstances. Therefore, in the bulk of what follows, caselaw concerning the statue of limitations is crudely assimilated into the procedural briar patch habeas petitioners
must overcome.23 Such simplifications, I submit, are warranted
in the service of my ambition of capturing the elemental movements and motive forces of the postconviction habeas case law
generated by the Roberts Court.
The setting forth and then explaining of this immanent dynamic within the case law proceeds in three stages, corresponding to the piece’s three parts. Its load-bearing elements, however, are Parts I and II, which are descriptive and positive in
character. Only in Part III do I entertain some normative entailments—and then only with due caution. In Part I, I offer a
parsimonious account of 28 USC § 2254 jurisdiction.24 My aim in
22 See Schlup v Delo, 513 US 298, 326–27 (1995). See also text accompanying notes
55–65 for further discussion.
23 See AEDPA § 101, 110 Stat at 1217, codified at 28 USC § 2244(d).
24 It bears repeating that I do not here focus on the case law created by petitions
filed by federal prisoners pursuant to 28 USC § 2255, even though they “compose onethird to one-half of the number of federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners.” Garrett and Kovarsky, Federal Habeas Corpus at 420 (cited in note 1). The overwhelming
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so doing is to show that—contra the weight of commentary—the
Roberts Court has converged upon a coherent approach to habeas review at least at the molar level and at least for the time being.25 This framework comprises two tracks or channels—hence
the eponymous two-track model of habeas26—into which petitions are slotted at a relatively early stage of litigation (and certainly long before a merits decision).27 For petitions slotted into
Track One, relief is well-nigh impossible to secure due to rules
limiting the constitutional issues that can be raised and the evidentiary record that can be considered, not to mention a host of
threshold procedural barriers. This first track covers much of
the landscape of postconviction habeas. By contrast, Track Two
is, in numerical terms at least, highly liminal—except at the US
Supreme Court. But in a sequence of unusual cases over the
majority of habeas cases decided by the Supreme Court are § 2254 cases. Many of these
cases effectively produce doctrine for both § 2255 and § 2254. Based on my reading of the
case law, I find little evidence that § 2255 play a formative role in the Justices’ thinking.
As a result, the Court’s conception of and frameworks for habeas are driven primarily by
concerns about federal-state relations rather than concerns internal to the national government. As a result of these considerations, narrowly targeted attention to § 2254 cases
alone (which, again, are most of the Court’s diet) provides an effective and sufficient
snapshot of the Court’s larger understanding of the postconviction habeas writ’s function—which is the ultimate goal of my analysis here.
Nor do I focus on the use of habeas in the national security context, about which I have
written elsewhere. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 Const Commen
385 (2010). See also Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 Duke L J
1415 (2012) (analyzing choice between Article III and Article I forums in national security lens using institutional design tools from the political science and complex systems
literatures). One of the surprising aspects of habeas practice, indeed, is the degree of
conceptual and doctrinal separation between postconviction habeas and habeas as a
challenge to executive detention. As a former habeas practitioner, my suspicion is that
lawyers in both camps sought to avoid being tarred by association with the other camp.
25 No doubt, there are many granular details within the doctrine that are currently
unresolved or contested, and I do not mean to suggest otherwise.
26 I use the metaphor of two tracks in a somewhat different way from Joseph L.
Hoffmann and William J. Stuntz, Habeas after the Revolution, 1993 S Ct Rev 65, 69.
Hoffmann and Stuntz deploy the metaphor not in a descriptive fashion, but in a normative manner in order to propose a bifurcation in the treatment of habeas cases depending
on whether innocence is at issue. As I explain in Part II.B, I do not believe that the Court
is sorting cases in order to identify likely innocent petitioners, as Hoffmann and Stuntz
suggest that they should. Further, I should note that I use the term “model” to refer to a
cluster of interlocking doctrinal rules that have a constant net effect on outcomes. My
usage of the term hence differs from the usage of Richard Fallon, who deploys the term
to reference “intellectual constructs, formed by a synthesis of familiar arguments and
views.” Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 Va L Rev 1141,
1143 n 3 (1988).
27 See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich L Rev 1145
(2009).
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past four years, the Roberts Court has carved out, and then repeatedly affirmed, an alternative pathway to relief for a small
class of habeas petitioners able to opt out of Track One usually
by showing excuse for a procedural default—to anticipate some
technicalities that I explore in Part I. For cases that are moved
into this second track, procedural barriers dissolve, constraints
on the scope of the evidentiary record relax, and deference deliquesces. A central question raised by this analysis concerns the
precise nature of the sorting mechanism at work here: What is it
that moves a petitioner from the modal Track One to the exceptional Track Two? I offer some narrow, doctrinal answers in Part
I, but this question requires a sustained theoretical analysis.
Part II thus homes in upon the question of what analytic
framework best explains the Court’s sorting between Track One
and Track Two. I consider a series of potential normative justifications for the Court’s bifurcated approach. My aim in so doing
is not to defend or vindicate what the Court has done. I do not
mean to suggest that the Court’s two-track model is optimal. Rather, I more modestly aspire to understand whether there is any
analytic coherence underwriting the Court’s unusual consensus
on managing the postconviction docket—to identify the analytic
framework, that is, that best predicts what the Court is doing.
Chastened as this enterprise might be in scope, its results warrant attention as a necessary precondition for any more ambitious reformist agenda or enterprise involving postconviction
habeas.
After briefly considering and rejecting federalism as an organizing optic, the balance of Part II considers closely three potential analytic foundations of current habeas doctrine. The first
views the two-track model as a sorting device. Bifurcation between habeas petitioners might hence be explained as a strategy
for searching for a hidden quality of habeas petitioners. On this
view, the aim of habeas doctrine is to separate petitions between
the two tracks under conditions in which unsuccessful petitioners are likely to mimic successful applicants. Drawing on insights from an economic literature on signaling, I raise doubts
about the Court’s success in fashioning a mechanism that sorts
meaningfully between different classes of petitioners.
Second, the two-track model might be glossed as a mechanism to generate needful feedback between state and federal
courts. On the one hand, habeas doctrine must incentivize state
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to comply with relevant
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constitutional norms. On the other hand, it must avoid overdeterrence or the supposedly costly intergovernmental friction
triggered by disregard for the state’s interest in finality.28 At the
same time, habeas doctrine must avoid unintended perverse effects, such as moral hazard for state actors or for prisoners.29
Exploring both of these potential feedback mechanisms, which I
call the “moral hazard” and the “sentinel” theories of habeas, I
suggest that feedback-based explanations do not satisfactorily
elucidate existing doctrine.
A final explanation of two-track habeas looks to the “faultbased standard” that one scholar argues has become “the general liability rule for constitutional torts.”30 Rather than attending to hidden qualities or incentive effects, that is, habeas doctrine allocates relief based on a normative judgment about the
degree to which both the state and its prisoners have complied
with relevant legal norms. In Track One, prisoners prevail only
by demonstrating an extraordinary measure of fault akin to
gross negligence or recklessness on the part of the state. In
Track Two, prisoners prevail by showing an extraordinary degree of faultlessness coupled to a degree of state blameworthiness. Of these three models, the fault-based model is perhaps
the closest fit with existing case law. Moreover, there is striking
parallelism between the way that the Court conceptualizes fault
in the constitutional tort context, and the way it organizes its
postconviction jurisprudence. In effect, I suggest, the Court has
aligned the liability rule in postconviction doctrine with that
employed in another domain of constitutional remedies, that of
constitutional torts.
Part III considers the implications of habeas’s coherence for
reforming agendas proposed in recent scholarship. Clarifying
the justifications for existing doctrine, I suggest, undermines restrictionist reform agendas in particular. In the alternative, I
suggest a more modest role for our current habeas writ, albeit
within a larger enterprise: the difficult effort to reform criminal
justice institutions at a moment of sudden flux and opportunity
in public and political attitudes toward that system. This refor-

28 See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv L Rev 441, 452–53 (1963).
29 See Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 491–92 (1986) (expressing concern about petitioners’ “sandbagging” prosecutors).
30 John C. Jeffries Jr, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va L Rev 207,
209 (2013).
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mulation of the writ, while not meet to all appetites, at least
provides a direction and purpose to the seemingly endless milling of habeas petitions into dust by the cogs and pistons of the
federal judicial system.
I. HABEAS’S TWO TRACKS
A simple bifurcated framework undergirds the postconviction habeas jurisprudence of the Roberts Court—or so I shall argue in this Part. Habeas, on this view, has two tracks onto
which petitions are triaged. This doctrinal splitting is a device
for calibrating how much judicial attention a petition should receive.
Track One captures most petitions that are either adjudicated on the merits in state court or, instead, subject to adequate and independent state bars or, alternatively, federal procedural constraints. Track One, indeed, can be understood as the
summa of a familiar web of procedural and substantive barriers
that dominate much habeas case-law and practice. Further,
Track One terminates in stringent criteria for relief. Few, if any,
of the petitioners who reach this point can hope to obtain a vacatur of their conviction.
In Track Two, by contrast, there are very few petitions: It is
a residual category into which only the rare petitioner falls,
usually as a result of demonstrating cause and prejudice to excuse an otherwise prohibitory procedural bar. But the thicket of
procedural hurdles is thinned and the standard of review is substantially more generous toward petitioners. The expected rate
of relief in Track Two is higher than in Track One.
Two important threshold caveats to this account are worth
flagging: First, the model limned below does not explain all of
the doctrine’s complexities. Instead, it aims to capture the basic
logic by which judicial resources are allocated, and as a consequent, habeas relief is granted or denied. Its focus is also the
“law on the books” (and in particular the law in the US Reports),
and not “law in the trenches.” Compliance by lower courts with
the framework likely varies by judge and circuit, as in most other domains of law.31 Obviously, a circuit-by-circuit treatment of
habeas law would require volumes—and would be of uncertain
31 See Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 452 (cited in note 10) (noting that “petitioners’ success rates vary enormously by circuit”). There is much work to
be done developing a nuanced account of how habeas jurisprudence modulates between
circuits.
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use for future guidance. Because several of the model’s key elements are of relatively recent vintage,32 not all of the framework’s elements can be observed working out fully in practice.
To the extent it is relevant, however, I flag obvious bellwether
cases in the federal circuit courts.
Second, my account here is largely preoccupied with precedent, and it has relatively little to say about the statutory text or
those cases that merely grapple with the plural and overlapping
opacities of the federal postconviction review statute. Habeas
demands a statutory basis, or so claimed Chief Justice John
Marshall in dicta in 1807.33 Consistent with the obligation to enact such jurisprudence that Marshall perceived in the Constitution, Congress installed habeas in Section 14 of the 1789 Judiciary Act.34 That jurisdictional grant did not, however, permit
state prisoners to challenge their petitions in federal court.35 It
was not until 1867 that Congress expanded the writ’s compass
to reach postconviction review of state convictions.36 But that led
to no immediate change in patterns of case filings or dispositions. It was not until almost a century later that the Court read
that 1867 grant expansively enough to enable meaningful ex
post review of state convictions.37 (If nothing else, the pace of
this development underscores the extent of judicial rather than
congressional control over the writ’s trajectory). The Court’s
eventual acquiescence to such jurisdiction was taken in the
teeth of fierce criticism on historical grounds from the academy38
but has stuck at least until now.

32 Two important cases were handed down in May 2013—too recently to have an
observable impact on the courts of appeals. See generally McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct
1924 (2013); Trevino v Thaler, 133 S Ct 1911 (2013).
33 See Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 US (4 Cranch) 75, 94–95
(1807).
34 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 14, 1 Stat 73, 81–82. But see Eric M. Freedman,
Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty 20–38 (NYU 2003) (arguing that
Marshall erred in requiring a statutory basis for a federal court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction).
35 Appellate writ-of-error review, however, could be obtained in the Supreme Court
under § 25 of the Judiciary Act if a state statute was challenged as “repugnant to the
constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789 § 25, 1 Stat at
85–87.
36 Act of February 5, 1867 (“Habeas Corpus Act of 1867”), ch 28, § 1, 14 Stat 385,
385–86.
37 Fay v Noia, 372 US 391, 415–16 (1963).
38 See Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal
Historian, 33 U Chi L Rev 31, 35–38 (1965) (criticizing the use of legislative history in
Fay v Noia).
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The 1867 jurisdictional anchor has been amended numerous
times,39 most recently in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).40 Despite this rich history of legislative action, the text and structure of the habeas statute, which
is centered on 28 USC § 2254, the statutory text, too often does
scanty explanatory work.41 And in many instances Congress
simply codifies post hoc judicial innovations, or accepts ideas
floated outside the context of regnant law.42 Although notionally
interpretations of that statute, and in particular AEDPA, the
most important elements of postconviction habeas jurisprudence
are either freestanding judicial creations or statutory texts codifying judicial ideas. Contra the great Chief Justice, therefore,
habeas today is in large measure not a product of legislative intent, but rather the product of his own Court.43 Whatever justifications, whatever downstream effects the two-track model has,
in my view they should be traced back primarily to the Supreme
Court, and not to Congress.44
39 See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S Cal L Rev 2331, 2350–76,
2416–23 (1993).
40 AEDPA, 110 Stat at 1214.
41 The legislative history of major changes to the habeas statute is notoriously
opaque. The legislative history of the 1867 Act comprised “presentation without written
report . . . without discussion of its purposes in either house other than the explanation
offered by the member reporting it, with its proponent in the Senate ignorant of both its
genesis and of the explanation offered by its draftsman on the floor of the House.” Mayers, 33 U Chi L Rev at 42 (cited in note 38). The legislative history of AEDPA is also ambiguous and less subject to unidirectional readings than the Court has sometimes suggested. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tulane L
Rev 443, 445 (2007) (“Given what we know about AEDPA’s legislative history, there is
little support for the argument that courts should interpret AEDPA’s ambiguities with
any particular purposes in mind.”). See also Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and
Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 NYU L Rev
699, 705 (2002) (“AEDPA is replete with ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies [that]
are quite obviously the products of the haste with which the statute was drafted and the
emotional context in which it was debated and enacted.”) (citation omitted). Efforts to
explain habeas jurisprudence in light of a single congressional intent, accordingly, are
futile.
42 Consider, for example, Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia in Wright v West, 505 US 277, 288–95 (1992), arguing
for something less than de novo review of state court rulings on the law anticipated 28
USC § 2254(d)(1).
43 See Freedman, Rethinking the Great Writ at 139 n 21 (cited in note 34) (collecting authorities for this point). On the supervisory power of the Supreme Court, see
McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 340 (1943) (asserting such authority).
44 The division of institutional labor in the articulation of habeas jurisdiction, in my
view, warrants more careful theoretical scrutiny than it has to date received. The general pattern (with some recent exceptions) is that Congress has expanded or consolidated
jurisdiction, whereas the Court has propelled jurisdictional retrenchment. Contra the
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A. Track One
Track One captures the modal—and indeed all but the marginal—postconviction habeas petitioner. It is characterized by
three barriers to relief: (1) a sequence of procedural bars largely
imagined first by the Court, (2) a standard of review that tips
the scales heavily toward the state, and (3) a chary understanding of the relevant evidentiary record. As onerous as the Track
One path has been, the Court amplified its difficulties in a pair
of 2011 decisions.45 Although both decisions attracted partial
dissents, in neither case did the dissent attract four votes. Moreover, neither decision provoked durable resistance from any
member of the Court. I first present the central trilogy of barriers (procedural, then evidentiary, then substantive) that regulate the availability of habeas relief. I then separately examine
the Court’s 2011 decisions as a way of underscoring the motifs
that consciously underwrite Track One. These two decisions
merit highlighting for the additional reason that they contrast
usefully with a sequence of five contemporaneous decisions
handed down from 2010 to 2013 that cement the contours of
Track Two.46
1. Procedural barriers.
A plurality of claims in postconviction habeas petitions are
dismissed on procedural grounds applicable prior to merits consideration.47 Most importantly, a claim can be aired in postconviction habeas only if it has been fairly presented to a state court
and thereby “exhausted.”48 Originally a judicially crafted rule,49

image of empire-building justices keen on amplifying their suzerainty over a maximum
scope of policy matters, the judiciary seems to have a veritable allergy to habeas jurisdiction. I aim to explore this dynamic, which I only touch on here, in future work.
45 See generally Cullen v Pinholster, 131 S Ct 1388 (2011); Harrington v Richter,
131 S Ct 770 (2011).
46 See text accompanying notes 121–139.
47 A 2009 study led by Professor Nancy King concluded that 58 percent of noncapital habeas cases in a sample of federal-court litigation were dismissed entirely on procedural grounds. See Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II, and Brian J. Ostrom, Final
Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death
Penalty
Act
of
1996
*45
(2007),
online
at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2013).
48 See, for example, O’Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US 838, 839 (1999). The state can
also expressly waive its exhaustion defense. 28 USC § 2254(b)(3).
49 See Ex parte Royall, 117 US 241, 251 (1886).

HABEAS HUQ SSRN (DO NOT DELETE)

114

The University of Chicago Law Review

3/7/2014 12:46 PM

[81:NNN

exhaustion has had a statutory berth since 1948.50 The statutory
text, though, provides incomplete direction as to how exhaustion
works. Rather, the mechanics of exhaustion have emerged via
serial judicial glosses. Hence, the Court has installed a “full” exhaustion rule such that all claims in a petition must be exhausted before any can be adjudicated in federal court.51 The Court
has also limited petitioners’ opportunities to stay federal proceedings so as to return to state court to raise unexhausted
claims.52 Claims not aired adequately in a state tribunal are
dismissed under a nonstatutory procedural default doctrine.53 In
addition to the Scylla and Charybdis of exhaustion and procedural default, there are additional statutory barriers to second
or successive petitions54 and untimely petitions (pursuant to a
stringent one-year federal statute of limitations).55
Importantly, this cluster of threshold impediments to merits
consideration is not without exceptions. The exceptions—which I
will take up in more detail when I turn to Track Two—do not alter fundamentally the modal or median outcome in habeas litigation. In the case of procedural default, the Court has carved
out exceptions when petitioners show “cause and prejudice,” or
alternatively present evidence of a “fundamental miscarriage of
justice.”56 The term “fundamental miscarriage of justice” comprises those extremely rare instances in which a court is presented with powerful evidence that a constitutional violation has
likely resulted in the conviction of one who is “actually inno-

50 28 USC § 2254(b)(1)(A). See also Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 515–16 (1982) (discussing codification history of exhaustion doctrine).
51 Lundy, 455 US at 519–20.
52 See Rhines v Weber, 544 US 269, 277 (2005) (holding that “stay and abeyance is
only appropriate when the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his claims first in state court”). District courts also need not
warn petitioners of the consequences of withdrawing a petition for exhaustion. See Pliler
v Ford, 542 US 225, 231 (2004).
53 See Coleman v Thompson, 501 US 722, 753–54 (1991) (elaborating the procedural default rule).
54 See 28 USC § 2244(b)(1)–(2).The term “second or successive,” however is a “term
of art,” which does not encompass all cases within its literal compass. Magwood v Patterson, 130 S Ct 2788, 2797 (2010), quoting Slack v McDaniel, 529 US 473, 486 (2000). See
text accompanying notes 115–120 for further discussion of the exceptions.
55 28 USC § 2244(d). In the decade after AEDPA’s enactment, the Court granted
review in nine cases involving the statute of limitations, making it one of the primary
sources of doctrinal complexity in postconviction habeas. See Blume, 91 Cornell L Rev at
290 (cited in note 17).
56 Coleman, 501 US at 753–57.
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cent.”57 Obviously, this occurs very infrequently,58 and it cannot
be assumed that the fundamental miscarriage of justice rule will
play a significant role in practice beyond a marginal set of outlier cases.59
Cause for a procedural default, by contrast, has been only
loosely defined to require something “external” to a petitioner60
whereas the definition of prejudice has remained somewhat
fuzzy at the edges.61 Violations of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel count as excusing cause.62 This may not be of much consequence, for the standard for unconstitutionally ineffective assistance is pitched exceedingly low. Cause, therefore does not
sweep in quotidian attorney negligence, which may well be pervasive in states’ criminal adjudicative systems.63 This places extenuating cause beyond the grasp of most petitioners.64 In consequence, excuses for procedural defaults—and by analogy excuses
for untimeliness or a successive petition—are scarce, albeit
seemingly more common than fundamental miscarriages of justice. They are, though, the main gateway through which petitioners can step to enter Track Two. Accordingly, I will assume
it is not feasible to make such an excuse for the purposes of discussing Track One, althogh I will pick up on that possibility in
the following Sections.
2. Evidentiary and standard-of-review barriers.
Petitioners who thread these procedural gateways are not
yet out of the woods. They still face two additional doctrinal
57 Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478 at 495–96 (1986); Schlup, 513 US at 326–27; Lee
Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 Cornell L Rev 329, 336–37 (2010)
(exploring history of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception).
58 This infrequency may be due either to the absence of instances of actual innocence, or alternatively due to the resource constraints on convicted defendants.
59 The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, however, may play a significant role in those cases in which there is exculpatory DNA evidence that comes to light
after a conviction becomes final. I am grateful to Professor Garrett for conversation on
this point.
60 Carrier, 477 US at 488.
61 See Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 26.3[c] at 1507–16 (Lexis 6th ed 2011) (citing various formulations of the
prejudice test).
62 Carrier, 477 US at 488; See also Coleman, 510 US at 754.
63 For the standard’s canonical formulation, see generally Strickland v Washington,
466 US 668 (1984).
64 See Maples v Thomas, 132 S Ct 912, 922 (2012) (“Negligence on the part of a
prisoner’s postconviction attorney does not qualify as ‘cause.’”), quoting Coleman, 510
US at 753.
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hurdles. In 2011, the Court substantially transformed both of
these hurdles. To understand those changes, it is helpful to keep
in mind the law prior to 2011. I accordingly begin by specifying
that status quo ante. First, the Court has long imposed strict
limits to petitioner efforts to expand the evidentiary record upon
which relief might be granted.65 In the decade and a half after
AEDPA’s enactment, it was common ground in the courts of appeals that petitioners challenging their state court convictions
on the ground of a factual error could not expand the record.66 In
contrast, petitioners asserting legal error could under limited
circumstances seek to expand the evidentiary record to demonstrate how a state court went astray.67
Second, AEDPA imposed highly deferential standards of review for both legal and factual error when a state court has
reached the “merits” of a constitutional claim.68 Assuming the
state court reached a merits decision, factual errors are cognizable only if “unreasonable.”69 A merits decision warrants relief on
the basis of legal error if the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.”70 As first interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 2000
case of Terry Williams v Taylor,71 this allowed relief only when
“the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a
case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts,” or alternatively, when the state court “iden65

See Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504 US 1, 7–8 (1992).
28 USC § 2254(d)(2) (barring relief unless “a [state court] decision . . . was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding”) (emphasis added).
67 Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 963 (cited in note 12) (“Lower courts [ ] believed that
they could conduct new fact development when deciding whether a state court decision
was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law, even if they did not always choose to allow in new evidence.”).
68 28 USC § 2254(d)(1)–(2). In addition, courts will decline to apply “new rule[s]” in
habeas cases except in exceptional circumstances. Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 307
(1989) (plurality). Teague, however, rarely bites in noncapital cases, likely because of the
stringency of § 2254(d)(1). See King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report at
*49 (cited in note 47) (noting rarity of Teague arguments in noncapital cases since the
rule “may be subsumed under . . . § 2254(d)).
69 28 USC § 2254(d)(2). See also Wood v Allen, 130 S Ct 841, 848 (2010) (noting circuit conflict about how the reasonableness rule in § 2254(d)(2) interacts with the presumption in favor of state court factual conclusions in § 2254(e)(1), but declining to resolve it).
70 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
71 529 US 362 (2000).
66
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tifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.”72 At least as initially specified, this formulation
did not constitute categorical deference to state courts’ opinions
on constitutional matters.73 Indeed, in Terry Williams itself, the
Court rejected a ruling from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
to the effect that “a state-court judgment is ‘unreasonable’ in the
face of federal law only if all reasonable jurists would agree that
the state court was unreasonable,” and granted habeas relief.74
Nevertheless, the Court’s construction of § 2254(d)(1)’s legal
standard in Terry Williams certainly added to the barriers narrowing the way to habeas relief.75
3. Richter and Pinholster.
All this seems minatory enough. Yet the Court in 2011 issued two decisions that render the possibility of relief even more
remote by calcifying both the evidentiary standard and the
standard of legal review, particularly regarding summary opinions. First, Cullen v Pinholster,76 reconfigured habeas practice
by holding (contra most circuit precedent) that habeas petitioners are categorically prohibited from expanding the record when
challenging errors of law when a claim has been adjudicated on
the merits in state court.77 Pinholster limits the evidentiary record available to the federal habeas tribunal to that developed in
state court. This record can be especially cramped when an issue, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or a state failure to
72

Id at 412–13.
See Blume, 91 Cornell L Rev at 276 (cited in note 17).
74 Terry Williams, 529 US at 377 (Stevens) (discussing a standard installed in
Green v French, 143 F3d 865, 870 (4th Cir 1998)).
75 A harmless error threshold also constrains habeas relief, although in practice
rarely seems to bite. See Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993) (holding that
habeas relief will issue only when an error has “a substantial and injurious effect” on the
jury verdict).
76 131 S Ct 1388 (2011).
77 Id at 1398 (holding that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that
was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits”). Only Justices Alito
and Sotomayor objected to this ruling. Id at 1411 (Alito concurring); Id at 1413–15 (Sotomayor dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined another part of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Pinholster was anticipated by Schriro v Landrigan, which sharply limited the discretionary authority of district courts to hold evidentiary hearings. 550 US
465, 473–74 (2007). But the conventional reading of AEDPA prior to Pinholster was that
it wrought no “dramatic change” on the availability of evidentiary hearings. Larry W.
Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 BU Pub
Int L J 135, 144 (1996).
73
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produce exculpatory material, can be raised only after an appeal
is complete.78 States rarely provide counsel on state postconviction review and often make it “virtually impossible” to secure an
evidentiary hearing in such proceedings.79 The effect is likely
amplified by the frequent impoverished performance of trial
counsel. Until Pinholster, “[f]actual development through discovery and evidentiary hearings” was therefore a “hallmark” of
habeas practice.80 Now, such hearings will never occur pursuant
to the central provision of AEDPA, and only “errors . . . apparent
from the record” will be “redressable under § 2254(d).”81
Pinholster is also another noteworthy departure from the
statutory text. The latter contains a pellucid limit on the relevant record in § 2254(d)(2) but, equally clearly, does not contain
a parallel limit in § 2254(d)(1). The decision had a “swift impact,” marked by a spate of reversals and denials of relief in
both the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals.82
Once more, that impact is most fairly ascribed to the Justices,
and not to the 1996 Congress that scripted the words that the
Court purported to be interpreting. Hence, Pinholster is yet another example of habeas policy innovation starting with the
Court rather than Congress.83
The second transformative opinion of 2011, Harrington v
Richter,84 addressed two puzzles instigated by the § 2254(d)(1)
standard of review. First many state court opinions in criminal
appeal and postconviction matters are summary in form and
provide no legal reasoning.85 Section 2254(d)(1)’s command to
examine the reasonableness of such decisions had long divided

78 See Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel after Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 Yale L J 2604, 2609 (2013).
79 Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 900 (cited in note 10).
80 Marceau, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev at 122 n 135 (cited in note 15).
81 Ryan v Gonzales, 133 S Ct 696, 708 (2013).
82 Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 968–71 (cited in note 12). In Greene v Fisher, the
Court extended Pinholster by holding that the “clearly established” federal law relevant
to the § 2254(d)(1) inquiry encompassed only decisions handed down when the state
court ruled, rather than when that ruling became final. 132 S Ct 38, 44–45 (2011), citing
§ 2254(d)(1). See also Amy Knight Burns, Note, Counterfactual Contradictions: Interpretive Error in the Analysis of AEDPA, 65 Stan L Rev 203, 228–30 (2013) (analyzing
Greene).
83 For further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 33–45.
84 131 S Ct 770 (2011).
85 “[I]n California, upwards of 97%” of state postconviction litigation ends with a
summary disposition. Matthew Seligman, Note, Harrington’s Wake: Unanswered Questions on AEDPA’s Application to Summary Dispositions, 64 Stan L Rev 469, 471 (2012).
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lower federal courts.86 Resolving those disputes, Richter held
that summary dispositions could be treated as merits judgments
for the purpose of federal habeas review.87 In addition, Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Richter deployed a novel verbal
formulation to characterize the posture federal judges should
adopt toward state courts’ merits judgments. In granting relief,
Justice Kennedy explained, a federal judge should ensure that
“there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the
state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s precedents.”88 In
so holding, the Court implicitly rejected an alternative, and less
onerous, threshold for relief whereby a petitioner would have to
repudiate only the most likely or plausible ground of decision.89
In the context of summary dispositions, the Richter ruling
means a federal court must hypothesize all potential grounds
upon which a state court might have relied—and then deny relief if any one of those is reasonable.90
Pinholster and Richter deepen the odds against Track One
habeas relief both directly and indirectly. Their direct effect is
obvious enough from their verbal formulations. Their indirect
effect arises as follows: One way in which a petitioner could
challenge a summary disposition even after Richter was to invoke extra-record evidence demonstrating that the disposition
was unreasonable.91 Yet Pinholster might well preclude this.92
86

Id at 477–79 (discussing case law).
Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85 (“When a federal claim has been presented to a state
court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural
principles to the contrary.”). In Early v Packer, 537 US 3, 8 (2002), the Court anticipated
Richter by holding that § 2254(d)(1) required no citation of federal case law by the state
court.
88 Richter, 131 S Ct at 786 (adding that only “extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice system” warrant relief) (citation omitted). It is tolerably clear that Richter has not displaced the Terry Williams rule with respect to the “contrary to” element of
§ 2254(d)(2). See Metrish v Lancaster, 133 S Ct 1781, 1787 n 2 (2013).
89 See Burns, Note, 65 Stan L Rev at 220–21 (cited in note 82) (providing a rich
analysis of the possible ways in which unreasoned state court opinions could have been
treated).
90 “Federal habeas courts defer to state determinations that may in fact never have
been made whenever they find a summary, unexplained rejection of a federal claim to be
sustainable.” Johnson v Williams, 133 S Ct 1088, 1101 (2013) (Scalia concurring).
91 See Seligman, Note, 64 Stan L Rev at 498–99 (cited in note 85) (developing this
argument).
92 Wiseman argues that petitioners can also argue that “a state court’s procedures
are woefully deficient,” making a decision on the merits infeasible. Wiseman, 53 BC L
Rev at 978–81 & n 148 (cited in note 12) (citing post-Pinholster efforts to develop this
argument). See also Marceau, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev at 149 (cited in note 15) (“[T]he best
reading of Pinholster is that its limitations on federal factual development are, like the
87
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The combined footprint of the two decisions, therefore, may be
wider than first appears because Pinholster compromises the
one way petitioners could meet the Richter standard when faced
with a summary order.
Although neither Justice Kennedy nor any other Justice
noted as much, Richter marked a rupture from the central
standard of legal review employed in postconviction habeas
since 2000. Of note here, Richter’s “no fairminded jurist” standard tracks precisely the ‘no reasonable jurist’ standard that the
Terry Williams Court had rejected eleven years previously when
it repudiated a decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
deploying almost exactly the same verbal formulation.93 What at
least seven Justices found banal in 2011,94 that is, had been repudiated sharply by six Justices in 2000 as inconsistent with the
statutory text.95
It is too soon to say whether this intellectual shift will make
much difference in the lower court trenches. Habeas denial rates
may be so high already that Richter’s impact will be inframarginal. Nevertheless, there are early signs that at least
lower court judges are heeding Richter’s new verbal formulation.96 It is quite possible that the Richter language, moreover,
will be picked up as evidence of a general principle of habeas rationing: that the purpose of § 2254(d) is not the identification of
serious errors of law (which may be quite frequent) but only a
tail population of extreme errors (which, by definition, must be
rare).
Moreover, it is instructive to consider the cause of this shift
in doctrinal specification: The State of California’s brief in Richter did not challenge the Terry Williams formulation. Nor did it

deference in (d)(1) more generally, conditioned on a full and fair state process.”). In effect, these potential responses to Pinholster—which, to be clear, have yet to be tested in
the federal courts’ crucible—would seek to wrench the case into what I call Track Two.
93 See text accompanying notes 68–75.
94 Justice Ginsburg concurred in the Richter judgment in a concurrence that is
hardly limpid in its clarity (and Justice Kagan did not participate). 131 S Ct at 793. But
both Justices later endorsed Richter. See Metrish, 133 S Ct at 1786–87 (Ginsburg);
Greene, 132 S Ct at 43–44 (unanimous opinion filed by Justice Scalia relying on Richter).
95 Both Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer) and Justice O’Connor’s controlling concurrence (joined by Justice Kennedy)
rejected the Fourth Circuit standard. Terry Williams, 529 US at 376–90, 412–13.
96 See, for example, Young v Conway, 715 F3d 79, 96–97 (2d Cir 2013) (Raggi dissenting) (arguing that Richter did change the applicable standard of review). See also
Dorsey v Stephens, 720 F3d 309, 315 (5th Cir 2013) (emphasizing the “fairminded jurists” language in dismissing a claim).
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seek its dilution.97 Hence, like Pinholster, Richter made a striking change to habeas practice based on a statutory interpretation of a fifteen-year-old law that had been consistently interpreted otherwise by lower courts. And it did so sua sponte. All
recognize that statutory interpretation rests on some exercise of
judgment, but it beggars belief to attribute the Pinholster and
Richter rules to the Congress that had remained idle for fifteen
years after the law was enacted.
Instead, the catalyst to alter the law—without briefing,
without public deliberation, and almost sotto voce—was instead
an ideologically heterogeneous supermajority of the Court itself.
For neither Pinholster nor Richter prompted even a protesting
squeak from the liberal wing of the Court. To the contrary, liberal Justices either joined the two majority opinions or joined
later judgments employing the Richter standard.98 These cases
thus present in rich distillate the Court’s shared view of the
Great Writ—a view that may evolve over time, but that, as it
evolves, secures updated doctrinal formulation without regard to
any infidelity to the preferences of the enacting 1996 Congress.
The net effect of Track One’s procedural, evidentiary, and
standard-of-relief barriers approaches a categorical prohibition
on relief for habeas petitioners. To see why, consider what a habeas petitioner would have to do to secure relief within the strictures of Track One (assuming, again, there is no cause for procedural-default purposes).
To begin with, the petitioner would have to air both the factual and legal predicates of his or her claim in state court without violating any adequate and independent state law procedural constraints. Having timely filed in federal court a petition
with solely exhausted claims, the petitioner would then have to
identify and prove up either an unreasonable factual finding—
without being able to introduce contrary extra-record evidence—
or a ruling on constitutional law that no reasonable jurist could
endorse. Finally, the petitioner would have to show a valid claim
on the merits notwithstanding habeas’s nonretroactivity and
harmless error rules under regent criminal procedure precedent.
In many instances, moreover, the state court ruling will be
summary in nature, containing no legal reasoning. In such in97 See generally Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Harrington v Richter, No 09-587
(US filed May 10, 2010).
98 For subsequent high court invocations of the Richter standard, see, for example,
Jackson, 133 S Ct at 1992; Lancaster, 133 S Ct at 1787.
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stances, the petitioner will have to imagine all possible grounds
of decision the state court might have conjured—and refute all of
them. Add to this the fact that the petitioner most likely lacks
counsel both in the state postconviction context and the federal
habeas context. It is hardly surprising that habeas relief rates in
this context are so vanishingly small.
B. Track Two
Were Track One the whole story, assessment of postconviction habeas would be a simple matter. The doctrinal framework,
however, contains an avenue that permits petitioners to present
claims for de novo review notwithstanding procedural barriers.
Even as the Court in Pinholster and Richter was narrowing the
strait gate through which the modal habeas petitioner had to
pass, the very same slate of Justices handed down a sequence of
five other decisions limning options that kept open this Track
Two alternative for a select handful of prisoners. Like Pinholster
and Richter, these recent cases are poorly explained by appeal to
the bare statutory text or inchoate congressional policy. Rather,
they enact judicial preferences. Even if Track Two as recently
clarified provides no general license to opt out of the strictures
binding Track One,99 the Court’s insistent preservation of this
alternative—sometimes in the teeth of the statutory text—hints
at a distinct judicial understanding of habeas that cannot be reduced to mere hostility to petitioners.
1. Excusing defaults.
The kernel of Track Two lies in the deployment of excuses to
threshold procedural doctrines as a mechanism to avoid (or water down) downstream evidentiary and standard-of-review barriers. That is, a petitioner initially confronted by a gateway impediment to habeas review such as procedural default, the
statute of limitations, or the rule against second and successive
petitions, provides a reason for excusing that barrier. The petitioner is then entitled to a merits review. But this review will
not be executed under the straitened evidentiary record and
standard-of-review that regulate Track One if there is no state
99 Professor Nancy King has recently argued that recent decisions will change little
because of inter alia declining prison sentences, plea deals that preclude postconviction
review, the absence of feedback effects, and continued fiscal constraints. See Nancy J.
King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 Yale L J 2428, 2449–55 (2013).
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court decision on the merits. Able to supplement the record and
not shackled by the need to demonstrate the unreasonableness
of another judge, a petitioner has in expectation a greater
chance at (but hardly a guarantee of) relief than a substantially
similar litigant in Track One.
It is worth reiterating that as between the two routes petitioners might take to excuse threshold procedural bars, the invocation of cause and prejudice is likely more promising than
the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice route. It is a “rare case
where—had the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record
as a whole would lack reasonable doubt.”100 By contrast, violations of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, which can excuse procedural default and untimeliness,101 are likely to arise more frequently. Indeed, even if exiguous in its content, the constitutional right to effective assistance
is said to be one of the “most common” forms of cause invoked.102
Indeed, the Court is conscious of the Sixth Amendment’s
role in habeas doctrine. In a companion case to Richter, Justice
Kennedy called for “scrupulous care” in Sixth Amendment analysis because “[a]n ineffective-assistance claim can function as a
way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not
presented at trial [or in pretrial proceedings].”103 The Court’s
concern is somewhat overstated. Ineffective assistance is formally irrelevant to the question whether successive petitions can be
adjudicated because Congress in AEDPA displaced the Court’s
100

House v Bell, 547 US 518, 554 (2006). See also Schlup, 513 US at 327.
The habeas statute of limitation is a creature of statute. 28 USC § 2244(d)(1).
The Court, however, has supplemented the statute with an equitable tolling exception.
Pursuant to that exception, “a [habeas] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if
he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Holland v Florida,
130 S Ct 2549, 2562 (2010). See also McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924, 1931 (2013).
The Holland standard refers to “extraordinary” interference, language that aligns it
closely with the cause and prejudice standard employed for procedural defaults.
102 Amy Knight Burns, Note, Insurmountable Obstacles: Structural Errors, Procedural Default, and Ineffective Assistance, 64 Stan L Rev 727, 747 (2012). See also Tom
Zimpleman, The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Era, 63 SC L Rev 425, 447 (2011) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that is seemingly specifically tailored to the
cause and prejudice test.”).
103 Premo v Moore, 131 S Ct 733, 739–40 (2011) (brackets in original), citing Richter,
131 S Ct at 787–88. As one commentator notes, “ineffective assistance of counsel claims
came to dominate and define federal habeas litigation [and] changed the structure of
state postconviction rules in reaction to the new prominence of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims at the federal level.” Brandon L. Garrett, Validating the Right to Counsel,
70 Wash & Lee L Rev 927, 929 (2013).
101
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previous cause-and-prejudice regime104 with a narrower gateway
resembling the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice rule.105 Further, the Court has previously suggested that an ineffective assistance claim proffered as an excuse must be aired first in state
court.106 There are thus doctrinal limits to the excusing effect of
ineffective assistance, even without judicial recalibration of the
underlying constitutional right.107
What then happens when a petitioner has not raised a claim
in state court and would be blocked by the procedural default
rule but for the excusing effect of an ineffective assistance argument? The claim will not have been resolved “on the merits.”108 The deferential standard of legal review embedded in
AEDPA’s central provision accordingly will not apply after a
procedural default has been excused—although the same result
will not necessarily hold if a petitioner succeeds in having a failure to comply with the statute of limitations excused.109 Nor will
the Pinholster limitation on expansions of the record apply (because there has been no state court adjudication on the merits).110 In its place, a far more forgiving standard for ascertaining
when an evidentiary hearing is warranted arguably obtains.111
104 See McCleskey v Zant, 499 US 467, 493 (1991) (holding that cause-and-prejudice
standard applied in the abuse of the writ context).
105 28 USC § 2244(b)(2)(B).
106 See Edwards v Carpenter, 529 US 446, 451–52 (2000); Carrier, 477 US at 489.
The Carpenter rule might undermine the capacity for ineffective assistance to ever serve
as excusing cause. In effect the rule requires petitioners to raise an excusing ineffective
assistance claim in state postconviction proceedings, thereby creating another state court
ruling (reasoned or not) as a spur to federal-court deference. Yet in the sequence of recent cases discussed in this Part, the Court does not seem to view the absence of exhaustion as grounds for not employing ineffective assistance as cause. Rather, the Court’s
failure to make more of Carpenter is striking.
107 This is an instance of “remedial equilibration,” in which there is a “symbiotic relationship” between right and remedy. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum L Rev 857, 914 (1999).
108 28 USC § 2254(d). Default rests on an adequate and independent state ground.
The independence prong ensures that a claim found to be defaulted is never “on the merits.”
109 When a petitioner fails to comply with AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and secures equitable tolling under Holland, 130 S Ct at 2562, the federal court will still be
asked to review a state court judgment that is potentially “on the merits.”
110 See Pinholster, 131 S Ct at 1401 (noting the possibility).
111 See 28 USC § 2254(e)(2); Michael Williams v Taylor, 529 US 420, 427–29 (2000)
(construing § 2254(e)(2) as a cause-and-prejudice standard with respect to new evidentiary hearings). One wrinkle merits attention here: In his Pinholster concurrence, Justice Alito argued that the rule of Schriro v Landrigan, 550 US 465 (2007), would limit the
availability of hearings even when Pinholster did not. 131 S Ct at 1411–12 (Alito concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Landrigan, however, confirmed the “basic
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In what superficially seems a paradox, the habeas petitioner
who plays by the rules and presents a claim within the mainstream of Track One is subject to a less generous regime than
one subject to a procedural bar that is excused. In the context of
Track One, the Court has secured the doctrine against the possibility of de novo review by installing presumptions first in favor of procedural default112 and then in favor of inferring the existence of a state court merits judgment.113
The availability of a Track Two safety valve seems of importance to the Justices. Even where congressional intervention
seemingly quashes the possibility of excusing cause, the Court
has found ways to reinstall an escape hatch. Its decisions in this
vein challenge any reading of habeas jurisprudence as merely a
jeremiad against habeas petitioners114 in addition to confirming
once more the jurisprudence’s independence of any constraining
textual anchor. In 1996, AEDPA ousted the previously applicable cause and prejudice regime for excusing second and successive petitions.115 Nevertheless, the Court has read AEDPA’s
seemingly airtight textual prohibition on second or successive
petitions to contain hidden exceptions.116 It has insisted that
“second or successive” is a “term of art” imbued with elasticity.117
Consider, for instance, the treatment of Eighth Amendment
claims concerning the capital punishment of an offender who is
incompetent at the time of execution.118 Taking AEDPA at face
rule” that “the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing was generally left to the sound
discretion of district courts.” 550 US at 473. It then imposed limitations keyed to the limits on discretion contained in § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). Id at 473–74. When the reasons for
these limits on discretion do not obtain, there is no reason to think Landrigan’s limitation applies.
112 See Coleman, 501 US at 732–33, 737–40 (refusing to apply the presumption from
Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032 (1983), that an ambiguous state court decision rested on
federal law grounds).
113 See Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85.
114 This is not to say that the Court’s jurisprudence is free of value judgments. As in
other areas of the law, Justice Scalia is often willing to make his substantive policy
views known in the course of setting forth notionally neutral legal grounds. Compare
Martinez v Ryan, 132 S Ct 1309, 1322 (2012) (Scalia dissenting) (complaining about the
“monotonously standard” claims of ineffective assistance in habeas and venturing sarcastically to ask “has a duly convicted defendant ever been effectively represented?”),
with James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum L Rev 2030, 2102–10
(2000) (demonstrating how poor lawyering correlates to imposition of the death penalty).
115 Compare 28 USC § 2244(b)(2)(B), with McCleskey, 499 US at 493.
116 For more examples of how congressional intent is not always a powerful predictor of the direction of subsequent case outcomes, see text accompanying notes 77–98.
117 Magwood, 130 S Ct at 2797, quoting Slack, 529 US at 486.
118 See Ford v Wainwright, 477 US 399, 409–10 (1986) (prohibiting such executions).
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value would entail a de facto prohibition on such Eighth
Amendment claims, which could not reliably be raised at the
time a first federal habeas petition is typically filed. But the
Court has declined to treat a later petition containing such a
claim as either second or successive: whether or not a first petition mentioned the Eighth Amendment issue, petitioners have
been allowed to press the competency argument at the time of
execution.119 Even absent the perhaps powerful normative tugs
on second-and-successive doctrine from the competence-to-beexecuted issue, the Court’s interpretation of that statute has
evinced singular unwillingness to remain bound to the plain text
thereof.120 Rather than fidelity to congressional intent, or some
mechanical and unvaried antipathy to habeas petitioner, the
structure of habeas jurisprudence here evinces a commitment to
maintaining some pathway (however narrow) to Track Two.
2. The apotheosis of Track Two.
Such narrow pathways to relief might be dismissed as illusory. Or one might expect the Court that handed down Pinholster and Richter to tighten the screws on the procedural, evidentiary, and substantive barriers to habeas review in Track Two,
rendering the latter largely illusory. But in a sequence of five
opinions, the same Court that produced Pinholster and Richter
has amplified and confirmed the existence of Track Two—often
by supermajoritarian margins. To be clear, my argument here is
not with the empirical magnitude of these decisions’ effects,
which is already subject to debate.121 My argument instead is
that these Track Two decisions are evidence that the Roberts
Court has a coherent approach to habeas. Only by accounting for
both tracks, in my view, can one comprehensively grasp the
Court’s aspirations for the writ.

119 See Panetti v Quarterman, 551 US 930, 947 (2007) (creating an “exception” to
the prohibition in § 2244(b) for second applications raising a claim that would have been
unripe in a first application); Stewart v Martinez–Villareal, 523 US 637, 643 (1998)
(treating a second application as part of a first application where it was premised on a
newly ripened claim that had been dismissed from the first application “as premature”).
120 Another example is an opinion by Justice Thomas—joined by Scalia, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Stevens—that construed § 2244(b) not to prohibit a claim raised in a habeas petition challenging a resentencing, even though the claim could have been raised in
an earlier petition. See Magwood, 130 S Ct at 2801.
121 Compare Primus 122 Yale L J at 2613–16 (cited in note 78) (arguing for a broad
effect), with King, 122 Yale L J at 2433–35 (cited in note 99) (developing a more skeptical
analysis).
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Three of these five cases illustrate how poor lawyering can
trigger an excuse for noncompliance with a procedural bar. Each
of the three decisions affirms and expands a Track Two alternative to Track One’s exigencies. To begin with, recall that bad defense lawyering provides excusing cause for a procedural default
only if a petitioner has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at
the time of the poor attorney performance.122 But the Sixth
Amendment applies only through plea bargaining to trial and
appeal—and not, crucially, to postconviction contexts.123 Yet, either by law or by practice, many states limit direct appeals to
legal questions that can be resolved on the merits, channeling
issues that require factual development to some form of collateral forum.124 In two recent instances, however, the Court has
departed sharply from the previously ironclad rule that only
constitutionally deficient ineffective assistance counted as exculpatory counsel for the sake of procedural default.
In the first case, Martinez v Ryan,125 the habeas petition
centered on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in Arizona,
which expressly channeled that issue to the postconviction context.126 The petitioner in Martinez had counsel at the state postconviction phase, but this lawyer failed to raise a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim.127 By a vote of seven to two, the
Court held that such ineffective assistance, while not violating
the Constitution, could nonetheless rank as cause excusing a
procedural default in “an initial-review collateral proceeding on
a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”128 By the same seventwo vote, the Court in Maples v Thomas,129 held that cause was
present “when an attorney abandons his client without notice,
and thereby occasions [a] default.”130 Unlike Martinez, Maples
established no substantially new rule of law.131 It may be the ra122

See Carrier, 477 US at 488 (1986).
See Pennsylvania v Finley, 481 US 551, 555 (1987); Murray v Giarratano, 492
US 1, 10 (1989).
124 See Primus, 122 Yale L J at 2609 (cited in note 78).
125 132 S Ct 1309 (2012).
126 Id at 1314.
127 Id. Martinez also asserted that “he was unaware of the ongoing collateral proceedings and that counsel failed to advise him of the need to file a pro se petition to preserve his rights.” Id.
128 Id at 1315. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id at 1321.
129 132 S Ct 912 (2012).
130 Id at 922.
131 Maples, though, focused on abandonment as the lodestar of the ineffectiveness
analysis, whereas Martinez focused on the quality of attorney performance. See Wendy
123
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re mirror image to the seriatim Ninth Circuit reversals that
have characterized recent Supreme Court terms:132 an instance
in which the Court feels that a lower court denial of relief on
procedural grounds (here, in a capital case) cannot go unremarked.
Two years later, Trevino v Thaler,133 extended Martinez to
jurisdictions such as Texas where “state law . . . does not on its
face require a defendant initially to raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim in a state collateral review proceeding,” but rather makes it “‘virtually impossible’ for an ineffective assistance claim to be presented on direct review.”134
Where the “structure, design, and operation” of the state judiciary have the practical effect of channeling certain claims into a
forum in which the Sixth Amendment does not obtain, Justice
Breyer wrote for a five-member majority in Trevino v Thaler, ineffectual assistance by a lawyer or by the petitioner can serve as
excusing cause for failure to press a claim in state court135—and
thus a gateway to more amplitudinous evidentiary and legal review in federal court.136 Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito had been members of the Martinez majority, but dissented
in Trevino on the ground that Martinez had been a “narrow”
holding creating a “sharply defined exception” and hence “a clear
choice” for states.”137 (The last point, it bears noting, is somewhat difficult to grasp. Trevino also presents states with a clear
choice respecting appellate design, albeit with a more proZorana Zupac, Mere Negligence or Abandonment? Evaluating Claims of Attorney Misconduct after Maples v. Thomas, 122 Yale L J 1328, 1357–58 (2013). Maples also applies
to a broader range of claims than Martinez, which may be limited to trial-level ineffective assistance claims. See Hodges v Colson, 2013 WL 4414811, *9–10 (6th Cir) (declining to apply Martinez to an underlying claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
132 See note 20 (listing cases).
133 133 S Ct 1911 (2013).
134 Id at 1915.
135 Id at 1921.
136 In addition, the Court has recently extended Sixth Amendment effectiveassistance-of-counsel obligations to the plea bargaining context. See Lafler v Cooper, 132
S Ct 1376, 1386 (2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment can be violated by counsel’s
advice to reject a plea deal if a trial leads to a worse outcome); Missouri v Frye, 132 S Ct
1399, 1408 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be
favorable to the accused.”). This raises the intriguing possibility that a state-law adequate and independent bar arising from a plea deal (such as a waiver of collateral review) can be attacked as wanting a foundation in effective counsel.
137 Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1922–23 (Roberts dissenting).
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petitioner tilt. The Roberts/Alito position instead may rest on
the proposition that whereas states cannot openly choke off initial review of ineffective assistance claims, they may so do sotto
voce).
The final pair of opinions deal with the timeliness rules. I
have to this point given such rules short shrift on the ground
that most of the Court’s jurisprudence on AEDPA’s statute of
limitations is the result of a judicial need to resolve the complications castup by a poorly drafted provision. The two opinions
addressed here, though, intersect with the larger concern with
procedural probity and effective assistance articulated in Martinez and Thaler. In the 2010 case of Holland v Florida,138 the
Court endorsed the possibility of extrastatutory equitable tolling
of AEDPA’s statute of limitations.139 Then, in the 2013 case of
McQuiggin v Perkins,140 the Court held that a plea of actual innocence can excuse noncompliance with the federal statute of
limitations, even though Congress had seen fit to include no
such ground in its statutory schema for timely filing.141 Through
these cases, the Court mitigated the textual rigor of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations through atextual interpolations. Both open
breathing room for later-developed evidence, vitiating the possibility that a federal court will be presented with compelling evidence of actual innocence and barred by a finality-promoting
procedural rule from accounting for it.
C. Two-Track Habeas: A Recapitulation
Postconviction habeas has proven easy to caricature as empty “charade” or as intolerable incursion on state sovereignty. Yet
scrape away the carapace of dueling rhetoric, and a more coherent doctrinal structure emerges from the fog of discrete outcomes. In this model, there are two tracks into which habeas petitioners can be triaged at the inception of litigation. That
triaging is a tool for rationing judicial resources. It operates as a
mechanism for determining ex ante the quantum of judicial resources to be allocated to any given petitioner. The doctrine accordingly winnows a small number of cases for serious judicial
consideration, leaving a large body to be resolved in what might
fairly be termed a summary fashion.
138
139
140
141

130 S Ct 2459 (2010).
Id at 2562.
133 S Ct 1924 (2013)
Id at 1933.
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In this procedural system, the overwhelming majority of petitions remain in the strictures of Track One. This is the Minoan
labyrinth of exhaustion, procedural default, abuse of the writ,
and untimeliness. Here, even petitioners who navigate sharpelbowed threshold doctrines are largely laid low by the twin
minotaurs of Pinholster and Richter. If there is an Ariadnean
thread unspooling through Track One, it is cruelly evanescent.
Track Two, though, is a way of opting out of the labyrinth entirely—of finding an exit from procedural and substantive barriers. That exit is formulated through the confirmation (in Martinez and Maples, for example) and the expansion (in Trevino,
for example) of ineffective counsel as a gateway to more plenary
review than federal courts are accustomed to allowing. These
two tracks emphatically coexist: it, after all, is the same Court
that decided Pinholster and Martinez (both seven-to-two) within
the same year.142
I believe that this account of the overall doctrine is superior
to any obvious competitor. An obvious alternative explanatory
variable focuses on the distinction between capital and noncapital cases. To see the attraction of this alternative account, consider a 2009 empirical study of post-AEDPA cases litigated in
the district courts largely between 2000 and 2005 by Nancy
King, Fred Cheesman, and Brian Ostrom—a study that identified large, statistically significant differences between capital
and noncapital cases.143 The King, Cheesman, and Ostrom study
found that capital petitioners take longer to file cases, are dismissed as time-barred less frequently than noncapital cases, receive evidentiary hearings more frequently than noncapital petitioners, are more likely to receive merits review; and (most
strikingly) are thirty-five times more likely to be granted than
cases with no death penalty at stake.144 Underlying these findings is another striking contrast: whereas all but seven percent
142 This complex of rules bears a resemblance to Professor Bator’s conception of habeas as a guarantee of a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate a constitutional claim, but
the parallels are not exact. Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 455–56 (cited in note 28). Hence,
Pinholster and Richter in tandem can extinguish federal consideration of a claim even
when there was no plausible opportunity to develop that claim in state court. The Bator
formulation also does not explain the residual form of review in Track One, or provide
any traction on the breath of the pathways from Track One into Track Two. Finally, the
notion of a “full and fair opportunity” is elastic enough to allow for a spectrum of doctrinal arrangements. Of necessity, therefore, some further explanatory work must be done
to determine how judicial attention and habeas relief are allocated.
143 King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report, at *60 (cited in note 47).
144 Id at *63.
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of capital petitioners have counsel, only seven percent of noncapital filers benefit from a lawyer’s aid.145
Notwithstanding this powerful observational evidence, there
are several independent reasons for resisting the temptation to
boil down the observed doctrinal structure to a crude capital/noncapital distinction. To begin with, this distinction does
not precisely map onto the cases. Some Track Two cases, such as
Martinez, are noncapital in nature. Many Track One cases are
capital in nature. Second, the Court has not verbally formulated
the doctrine in terms of a capital/noncapital distinction. If this
distinction indeed was driving the case law, it is hard to understand why the Court would obscure the font of its motivation. At
least in the absence of reason to do otherwise, it seems unwise to
assume that judicial actors lack even a scintilla of sincerity.
Third, the claim that the Court has crafted habeas doctrine to
enable more amplitudinous review in capital cases is at war
with what is known about the Court’s views of that strain of
cases. As Professor Bryan Stevenson has recounted in his fine
account of recent habeas history, Justices starting with Lewis
Powell have “inveighed against [ ] manipulation of the system by
capital prisoners and their lawyers.”146 Given the Justices’ expressed preferences about the capital/noncapital distinction, it is
not obvious why they would now converge upon a doctrinal
framework that treats capital cases with greater diligence and
care than might otherwise be the case.
Finally, the assumption that the capital/noncapital distinction so powerfully evinced in the results of Professor King and
her colleagues drives the formulation of two tracks in habeas
might have matters backward. It may be that the causal arrow
runs from the presence of counsel, rather than from the capital
nature of a case, to the strikingly different results in death cases. On this view, the doctrinal framework of habeas limned here
is best exploited by capital petitioners despite some Justices’
avowed intention of staunching the flow of such litigation in order to enable executions. The political economy of capital punishment is notoriously perverse. On the one hand, trial-level actors have strong incentives to maximize the number of death
sentences produced, and on the other hand “anti-death penalty
forces . . . [who] very early on [ ] made a . . . strategic decision to

145
146

Id at *62.
Stevenson, 77 NYU L Rev at 714–15 & n 75 (cited in note 4141).
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concentrate their efforts at the post-conviction stages.”147 The result of this lopsided political economy of litigation is a pool of
cases that are routinely characterized by both careless trial lawyering and also high-quality (and amply funded) postconviction
representation. The latter counsel are not only well positioned to
identify errors in state judicial process,148 they are also skilled
repeat players, well equipped to navigate the hairpin bends and
doctrinal switchbacks necessary to enter Track Two.
On this account, it is not that the death penalty is different.
It is rather that capital petitioners (or at least their postconviction counsel) are well positioned to exploit the two-track structure of habeas because of an exogenously determined political
economy of litigation-related resources. The doctrinal structure
is thus not necessarily well explained as being caused or motivated by the capital/noncapital distinction. To the contrary, the
persisting success of capital habeas petitions might generate
pressure from the conservative wing of the Court to reform or
collapse some aspects of two-track habeas.
Accordingly, while the Court’s analytic framework is surely
informed by the capital/noncapital distinction, it also stands independent of that distinction—and can properly be analyzed in
such terms. Yet at the same time, there are clear and substantial limits to the two-track model’s predictive and explanatory
force. It is important here to emphasize that mine is an account
of the Court’s overall approach to the doctrine, rather than an
observational account of what happens on the ground. Because
Supreme Court doctrine is no proxy for empirical patterns in the
lower federal courts, I stress once more that this Part in no fashion substitutes for the admirable empirical work by Professor
King and others. Patterns of case law in the apex court are salient instead if one believes that it is the justices, and not Congress, that are driving and shaping the general contours of postconviction habeas. The Court’s jurisprudence then reflects the
ideological and normative preferences that are motivating legal
change. It is a distillate of the implicit assumption that acts as a
motor in a discrete case.
There is no reason to think that this distillate precisely reflects lower court practice. To the contrary, habeas doctrine re147

Liebman, 100 Colum L Rev at 2032, 2073 (cited in note 114).
And there are many. See Andrew Gelman et al, A Broken System: The Persistent
Patterns of Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud
209, 213–17 (2004).
148
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flects the Court’s effort to signal its preferences over habeas policy to a dispersed and periodically refractory federal judiciary.
That is, the Supreme Court stands in a principal-agent relationship with lower federal courts.149 Enunciated doctrine in published opinions is a channel through which the Court’s instructions flow to its judicial agents across the country.150 Specific
precedent, for example, might render “control over the appellate
courts more effective; or . . . reduce the opportunities those
courts might enjoy for adventurism free of close supervision by
the Court; or . . . shape lower court results to reduce the likelihood of conflicts requiring Court intervention.”151 In each of
these enterprises, though, the Court must necessarily account
for the possibility that “utility maximizing appeals court judges
also have their own policy preferences, which they may seek to
follow to the extent possible.”152 The ensuing doctrine is accordingly “a means . . . to communicate . . . policy preferences,” albeit
one that must be adjusted for the risk of agency slack.153 Hence,
we might expect the ensuing jurisprudence to deemphasize
points of convergence across the federal judicial hierarchy, while
underscoring moments of disharmony and conflict.
Given these complex and entangled judicial purposes, it
would be implausible to assert that the existence of Tracks One
and Two translates in some mechanical way into empirical regularities in the lower courts. Nor am I suggesting that the increased frequency of Track Two cases in the Roberts Court corresponds to an uptick in grants of relief below the apex
tribunal.154 As commentators have been well aware for many
149 Compare Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer, Strategic
Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 Am Polit Sci Rev 101, 103 (2000), with Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A.
Segal, and Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent
Model of Supreme Court—Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Am J Polit Sci 673 (1994).
150 See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent
and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 755, 757 (2002).
151 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum L
Rev 1093, 1095 (1987). Professor Strauss’s point concerns Supreme Court review of the
agencies, but it translates here.
152 Songer, Segal, and Cameron, 38 Am J Polit Sci at 675 (cited in note 149).
153 Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial Hierarchy, 105 Nw U L Rev 535, 536–38 (2011) (describing the role of doctrine in principalagent accounts of the judicial hierarchy, but also going on to explore the limitations of
such models).
154 To the contrary, the increase in petitioner-friendly decisions in the Supreme
Court may be a slightly lagged signal of the absence of charity toward petitioners among
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years, securing habeas relief is akin to passing through a “needle’s eye.”155 The rise of Track Two might or might not greatly affect the size of the eye. Instead, the two-track model of habeas I
have developed in this Part should be understood as evidence of
the (agency-slack adjusted) policy preferences of the Justices in
relation to postconviction habeas policy. The animating architecture of those preferences merits attention on its own terms—as
the next Part endeavors to do—and further as a platform from
which to assess and critique the possibilities for habeas reform
proposed in the literature.
II. EXPLAINING TWO-TRACK HABEAS
Two-track habeas jurisprudence is a sustained “intellectual
construct” on the part of the Justices156 that reflects judicial policy preferences over the uses and limitations of postconviction
review. The aim of this Part is to pick out those ideas and preferences that best “capture, and at the same time [ ] explain and
unify”157 two-track habeas. My aim is to examine and test possible analytic models that might explain why the Court has
adopted this method of triaging cases as opposed to (say) . I examine a series of hypotheses concerning which analytic framework best predicts the Court’s overall approach. Based on this
examination, I then proffer a judgment about which one most
closely fits the case law. To be very clear, my aim is to understand, not defend, the Court.158 Although I do claim to identify
which ideological justification best underwrites two-track habeas, I posit only that this model has predictive force, not that it is
attractive. Accordingly, this Part should be read as an attempt,
modest in scope, to explain the ways of the Justices, not as a
vindication of those ways.
One obvious candidate should be ruled out ab initio: twotrack habeas is not, in my view, plausibly described as an exercise in constitutional interpretation. The consensus view today is
lower court judges, if the Court is operating as a corrective to trends in the courts of appeals and supplying a modicum of equilibration.
155 Anne M. Voigts, Note, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum L Rev 1103,
1104 (1999).
156 Fallon, 74 Va L Rev at 1143 n 3 (cited in note 26).
157 Id at 1145.
158 I do defend the Court to the extent that my claim in this Part is that its habeas
jurisprudence is analytically coherent. Whether it is analytically attractive, however, is
another matter entirely.
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that Congress can licitly withhold all postconviction review of
state convictions, as it did until 1867.159 Some recent scholarship
presses an alternative constitutional pedigree for postconviction
habeas.160 But there is little evidence the Court is likely to accept
such arguments anytime soon.161 Even if Article III, the Suspension Clause, or the Due Process Clause could sustain some mandatory quantum of postconviction habeas review,162 I do not rely
on speculative inferences from ethereal abstractions to justify
the observed doctrine. Rather, this Part seeks to make sense of
how the Court has sized and sliced habeas relief by recourse to
more mundane and less controversial models.163
My analytic reconstruction begins in seriousness with a rejection of one staple explanation of habeas jurisprudence—
federalism. I do not wholly deny that federalism (in the sense of
a regard for the regulatory autonomy of states) is an important
concern in habeas jurisprudence. Without obscuring the echoes
that percolate between postconviction habeas and other lines of
federalism jurisprudence, I suggest that federalism interests
cannot alone explain the balance struck in the two-track model.
Instead, I consider at greater length three alternative, more nuanced accounts, each of which is functionalist: the first is based
on habeas as a sorting mechanism either for innocence or for
grave constitutional error, the second speaks in terms of incen159 But see Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich L Rev 862, 868
(1994) (arguing that “the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized this supremacyensuring role of the federal courts such that Congress is obligated to make federal review
of state criminal convictions practically available through federal habeas corpus”).
160 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 Cornell L
Rev 47 (2012); Lee Kovarsky, A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power, 99 Va L Rev 753
(2013)
161 Indeed, the Court has long failed to cite constitutional concerns even in cases in
which they might be thought to subsist close to the surface. See Jordan Steiker, Habeas
Exceptionalism, 78 Tex L Rev 1703, 1705 (2000) (noting the absence of such discussion in
the Terry Williams opinions).
162 The idea of some mandatory quota of federal-court jurisdiction goes back at least
to Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 327–37 (1816).
163 Social choice theory suggests that the collective choice of a group decision-maker
such as the Court can be prone to cycling. Easterbrook, 95 Harv L Rev at 815–17 (cited
in note 18). The further inference might then be drawn that the two-track model may
simply reflect an arbitrary local equilibrium, and as such bears no sustained analysis. I
am not convinced this is so. For one thing, scholars of social choice theory emphasize the
way in which agenda-setting mechanisms can suppress cycles by favoring some outcomes
over others. See Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 Pub Choice 503, 507 (1981). Accordingly, the stability of
the two-track model likely reflects an equilibrium induced by the Court’s certiorari voting practice and its norms of intracollegial deference.
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tivizing state officials and prisoner litigants, and the third
sounds in terms of fault concepts drawn from constitutional tort
doctrine. Ultimately, I suggest that the final, fault-based account of two-track habeas best fits the doctrinal evidence.
A. Habeas as a Laboratory for Federalism
Perhaps the most famous sentence in contemporary habeas
jurisprudence is attributed to Justice O’Connor. Writing for the
Court in Coleman v Thompson,164 she began her majority opinion
with a forceful declaratory statement: “This is a case about federalism.”165 Taking Justice O’Connor’s hint, federalism—by
which she presumably means a due regard for state-level preferences as against national laws and institutions—provides a
touchstone for habeas jurisprudence. Consistent with this view,
both liberal and conservative justices tirelessly invoke a concern
about states’ interests in finality and the control of their adjudicatory apparatuses.166 The persistence of this federalism lament
might be strong evidence for construing habeas jurisprudence as
simply another forum in which the Court has worked out the
consequences of its distinctive view of federal-state relations. If
high-profile cases involving the 2010 federal healthcare legislation167 and voting rights measures168 are any guide, the Court
consistently views national intervention into regulatory domains
of traditional state competence gimlet-eyed.
On this view, the jurisprudential framework of habeas
might simplistically be glossed by noticing that the Court is often asked to resolve intraconstitutional tensions between the
1787 disposition of federalism and the post–Civil War or post–
New Deal settlements. Even when there is a strong textual and
originalist basis for cabining the 1787 view of federal-state relations—as there surely is with the Reconstruction Amend-

164

501 US 722 (1991).
Id at 726. For a critical examination of this dictum, see Eric M. Freedman, Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, in James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm, and Charles
S. Lanier, eds, America’s Experiment with Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Past,
Present, and Future of the Ultimate Penal Sanction 553, 567–68 (Carolina Academic
Press 2d ed 2003).
166 See, for example, McQuiggin v Perkins, 133 S Ct 1924, 1932 (2013) (Ginsburg)
(referring to finality and comity concerns); Edwards v Carpenter, 529 US 446, 451 (2000)
(Scalia).
167 See generally National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct
2566 (2012).
168 See generally Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013).
165
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ments—the Court persistently prefers the older dispensation. It
thus protects the legacy of the original Founders against those
who have amended the Constitution by formal Article V process
or otherwise. The diminution of postconviction writ is then just
another casualty of the war of 1787 against 1867.169
No doubt, federalism concerns gauged in this gauzy fashion
loom large in the habeas canon. To ignore the keening threnody
of comity and finality recited through the Court’s postconviction
jurisprudence would plainly slight a value close to the Court’s
collective heart. Nevertheless, there is some reason to think federalism concerns cannot provide a comprehensive lodestar for
understanding the operation of two-track habeas.
To begin with, notice that the opening phrase of Justice
O’Connor’s Coleman opinion is announcing an outcome, not an
analytic framework. Federalism values, that is, lie on one side of
the scale—but the other side has not been wholly evacuated.
Even Roberts Court jurisprudence evinces some concern for “the
historic importance of federal habeas corpus proceedings as a
method for preventing individuals from being held in custody in
violation of federal law” as a counterweight on the other side of
the scales.170 Doctrinal outcomes in habeas cases are no mechanical function of states’ interests. Rather, they flow from a complex balancing of finality and constitutional-compliance concerns. Attending solely to one side of the scale yields only
incomplete insight because it does not speak to how the scale is
calibrated. As a result, it cannot explain the outcomes in cases
such as Martinez, Holland, or Trevino—all supported by Justices with strong priors in favor of state control such as Justice
Kennedy.
Complicating the picture further, pro-state federalism concerns can cut in both directions. In Danforth v Minnesota,171 for
example, the Court held that the strong nonretroactive pre169 But see Mayers, 33 U Chi L Rev at 52–55 (cited in note 38) (doubting that the
1867 statute was initially understood as a means of implementing the Fourteenth
Amendment, as opposed to preventing the use of debt peonage arrangements as a substitute for slavery). I am not persuaded by Mayers’s historical gloss: He assumes that the
1867 statute was limited to a particular evil that manifested starkly to the law’s Republican drafters. But the law itself is written in general terms, and can also plausibly be
read to encompass other noncore cases of unjust imprisonment.
170 Trevino v Thaler, 133 S Ct 1911, 1916–17 (2013). See also Martinez v Ryan, 132
S Ct 1309, 1315–16 (2012); Holland v Florida, 130 S Ct 2549, 2562 (2010), quoting Slack
v McDaniel, 529 US 473, 483 (2000) (recognizing the “vital role in protecting constitutional rights” that habeas plays).
171 552 US 264 (2008).
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sumption for federal habeas did not carry over into state court
because “considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing
state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals.”172 Despite having expressed strong preferences for policy
decentralization elsewhere, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy dissented.173 Both the outcome and the distribution of
votes in Danforth suggest that the Justices’ votes cannot always
be predicted or explained in terms of pure federalism preferences. Nor is Danforth unique. In other cases, the Court has
construed habeas’s statute of limitations to ignore variance in
state law in favor of federal uniformity,174 and even allowed
states to withdraw waived objections to procedural defenses on
the ground that AEDPA’s federalism-related goals overtake the
usual presumption of litigant autonomy.175 These outcomes are
not well glossed by a concern with state autonomy.
In any event, it is misleading to assume that the Roberts
Court has applied a consistent preference for decentralization
that impacts each substantive domain in the same way and to
the same extent. To the contrary, even in core battlefields of federalism—such as in the drawing of boundaries around Congress’s enumerated powers—the Court has expressed heterogeneous and highly variable federalism-related preferences by
toggling between deferential and strict scrutiny in assessing
congressional work product.176 In the Court’s preemption case
law, the federalism boot is often on the other foot. There, it is
the liberal Justices who bemoan the demise of decentralization
and conservatives who laud national power.177 Preemption is a
particularly potent counterexample since its case law deals with
172 Id at 279–80. But see Jason Mazzone, Rights and Remedies in State Habeas Proceedings, 74 Albany L Rev 1749, 1765–66 (2011) (suggesting Danforth might have little
impact).
173 Danforth, 552 US at 291–92 (Roberts dissenting).
174 See, for example, Gonzalez v Thaler, 132 S Ct 641, 655–56 (2012) (refusing to
recognize state-law exceptions to the end of the window for discretionary state high
courts appeals in applying AEDPA’s statute of limitations).
175 See Day v McDonough, 547 US 198, 208 (2006) (holding that “[t]he considerations of comity, finality, and the expeditious handling of habeas proceedings that motivated AEDPA . . . counsel against an excessively rigid or formal approach to [the limitations defense]”).
176 See Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U
Chi L Rev 575, 586–611 (2013) (illustrating use of different standards of review across
federalism jurisprudence).
177 For examples of preemption cases in which liberals defend localism and conservatives defend national power, see generally Mutual Pharmaceutical Co v Bartlett,
133 S Ct 2466 (2013); Egelhoff v Egelhoff, 532 US 141 (2001).
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states’ interests not wholly dissimilar to those at stake in habeas
jurisprudence. In effect, Justices of all stripes treat states’ interest in finality in criminal cases as sufficiently different from
states’ interest in its rules for assigning liability out of private
transactions. Yet the criminal and tort liability addressed in habeas and preemption doctrine might arise from the very same
transaction and concern the very same individual. There is no
obvious reason the state’s interest should be assigned polar opposite valences in the two lines of cases.
In short, federalism concerns may loom large in habeas
doxa, but the Justices’ faith in states is a fickle, fluctuating one.
To explain habeas jurisprudence by conjuring federalism is to
beg the question. Moreover, the corpus of recent federalism jurisprudence provides no single measure of appropriate deference
to state-level choices, and no single transubstantive theory of
federal-state relations, to extend mechanically to the habeas
context. Instead, the Court sifts and assigns weights to specific
state interests differently in distinct institutional and doctrinal
contexts.178 Resiling mechanically to the rhetoric of federalism,
accordingly, in short, is hardly a comprehensive diagnosis of the
two-track model’s origins or analytic foundations. A more precise
instrument to locate the cut point between Track One and Track
Two is needed.
B. Habeas as a Sorting Mechanism
A first possibility is that the two-track model of habeas is a
mechanism to sort among the large pool of habeas filings for a
subclass of petitioners. To explore this possibility, I first set
forth a basic logic of sorting drawn from economics scholarship. I
then ask whether that logic can explain observed doctrine assuming one of two underlying targets for judicial search—
innocence and serious constitutional error.
1. The logic of sorting.
Habeas petitions are presented to the federal judiciary en
masse. Good petitions are mixed together with bad nonmeritori-

178 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 Wm & Mary L Rev 1733, 1748–49 (2005)
(“The open-textured nature of the Constitution’s structural commitments calls for judicial implementation through doctrine: There is simply no way to administer our federal
system without developing rules to flesh out the allocation and balance of authority.”).

HABEAS HUQ SSRN (DO NOT DELETE)

140

The University of Chicago Law Review

3/7/2014 12:46 PM

[81:NNN

ous petitions. All habeas petitioners seek the same relief, but only some are entitled to it. Federal judges, however, cannot directly observe the parameter that determines eligibility for relief. To be sure, some information appears on the face of a
petition. But sorting still presents a challenge since, at least at
the filing stage, meritorious and nonmeritorious petitions are
hard to distinguish. Appearances—that is, the content of petitions—are unreliable because applicants with nonmeritorious
petitions have strong incentives to mimic the observable characteristics of meritorious applicants by parroting the outward aspects of a meritorious claim.179 To be sure, this assumes some
sophistication on habeas petitioners’ part. But it is not implausible to envisage how such narrowly defined sophistication arises by imagining a large prison population in which one out of
every 5,000 petitioners overcomes motions to dismiss and secures a colorable hearing, such that the balance of potential petitioners need merely mimic that successful petition. As a result
of these dynamics, judges accordingly must seek out a proxy
that creates a separating equilibrium, rather than a pooling
equilibrium, between meritorious and nonmeritorious petitions.180
A threshold puzzle embedded in the sorting theory of habeas
is that there is disagreement about the underlying trait that
warrants relief. In a famous article, Judge Henry Friendly identified actual innocence of a crime as the salient parameter.181
Although the Court has never treated actual innocence—in the
sense of not being the person who committed a charged
crime182—as a freestanding ground for relief,183 it is possible that
179 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 Am Econ Rev 460, 463–64 (2002) (“[T]here are incentives on the part of individuals for information not to be revealed, for secrecy, or, in modern parlance, for a lack of
transparency.”).
180 For the difference between pooling and separating equilibria, see Andreu MasColell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory 455–57 (Oxford
1995).
181 See generally Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgments, 38 U Chi L Rev 142 (1970) (arguing that, subject to exceptions,
“convictions should be subject to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements
his constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence”).
182 See Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 NC L Rev 1083, 1085–86 (2011);
Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn L Rev 1629, 1645 (2008) (observing
that “[t]he word ‘innocence’ is used casually in the media and by lawyers, convicts, scholars, and courts,” and defining “innocent” as “those who did not commit the charged
crime”). A distinct sense of innocence is in play, however, in litigation about capital sentencing, where the question is eligibility for the death sentence.
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the Court’s complex menagerie of rules is nonetheless a way of
screening indirectly for innocence given the difficulty of direct
screening. Alternatively, the underlying case characteristic upon
which the Court may be focused may be the commission of egregious violations of constitutional criminal procedure that are
linked to “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system.”184 Although some commentary might be read to imply that
state judicial hostility to constitutional rights no longer exists,185
one might still explain the two-track habeas model as an effort
to sift out errors so egregious only hostility to constitutional
norms could have elicited them.186
Whether actual innocence or egregious error is the underlying characteristic of interest, the basic technology for sorting is
invariant across very different contexts. The relevant body of
theory was developed by economists to explain job market interactions—where employers face the same problem of creating a
separating equilibrium to distinguish desirable from undesirable
job applicants.187 Like federal habeas courts, employers need a
signal that distinguishes “good” from “bad” types. A parameter
can function as a signal in this fashion only if “the cost of the
signal is negatively correlated with the unseen characteristic
that is valuable to employers.”188 That is, “[s]ignals reveal type
if only the good types, and not the bad types, can afford to send

183 See District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v Osborne, 129 S Ct
2308, 2321 (2009) (explaining that whether “actual innocence” exists as a federal right
remains an “open question”); Herrera v Collins, 506 US 390, 404–05 (1993) (explaining
that “actual innocence” has never been held to be an independent constitutional claim).
184 Harrington v Richter, 131 S Ct 770, 786 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
185 See Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 900 (cited in note 10) (noting that this is
an implication of the Hoffmann and King argument, and responding that “states continue to systematically prevent criminal defendants from asserting and vindicating their
constitutional rights”).
186 Picking up on this possibility, Hoffman and King suggest that state hostility to
federal rights in the 1950s and 1960s explained and warranted federal habeas intervention in state criminal justice systems. Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 801–02 (cited in note 7). As Primus correctly notes, King and Hoffmann supply no reason to focus on
a state’s reasons for persistently disregarding federal rights, while viewing as unproblematic cases in which states systematically impinge on such rights not because of hostility to federal rights qua federal rights, but for other reasons. Primus, Review, 110 Mich
L Rev at 900–01 (cited in note 10). I therefore do not mean to suggest that a bad intent
would be necessary to show an egregious constitutional error.
187 For an overview, see Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont, Contract Theory
at 100–07 (MIT 2005). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q J Econ 1441 (2000).
188 Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of
Markets, 92 Am Econ Rev 434, 437 (2002).
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them, and everyone knows this.”189For example, in the employment context it is cheaper for a more productive employee to obtain education as a way to signal her worth than it is for an unproductive employee to mimic that signal. The additional
marginal cost to unproductive employees makes mimicry too
costly and hence not worthwhile. Analogously, federal habeas
courts must identify a signal that is more costly for nonmeritorious litigants to produce than meritorious petitioners. The negative correlation between the cost of signaling and underlying
quality makes it inefficient for the latter to mimic the former.190
The two-track model of habeas would be an effective sorting
device, either for actual innocence or for egregious error, if the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) The two-track model allows
petitioners to signal that a hidden trait in their cases provided
the necessary basis for relief, and at the same time (2) makes it
costly for other petitioners lacking that characteristic to mimic
the same signal.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that there are at
least two sorting mechanisms at work in two-track habeas.
First—and most importantly—doctrine sorts cases between
Track One and Track Two. Cases in Track One are very likely to
be decided in favor of the state with little judicial exertion. Cases in Track Two are likely to be decided with somewhat more
careful consideration of the facts and law, with a higher rate of
vacaturs and remands for petitioners at the margin. But second,
within Track One there is yet further sorting between cases
dismissed on procedural grounds and those dismissed on the
merits because their constitutional claims do not warrant relief
under the strictures of AEDPA.191
I will focus in what follows on sorting between Track One
and Track Two, and then return to sorting within Track One. I
will assume that getting onto Track Two is a precondition of relief. Consideration of both these sorting effects together suggests
that the best case for explaining habeas as a sorting mechanism
may focus on egregious state court error as the underlying hid189

Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 19 (Harvard 2000).
See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355, 367 (1973) (noting
that a negative correlation of signaling costs and the subject that is signaled, which in
Spence’s study is the productive capability of employees, “is a necessary but not sufficient condition for signaling to take place”).
191 Again, it is worth emphasizing that I am making generalizations here. There are
instances in which lower courts deny relief, and the Supreme Court reverses. See, for
example, Rompilla v Beard, 545 US 374 (2005). These do not fit neatly into this scheme.
190
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den characteristic. But even if it is a means for bringing to light
egregious error, however, the two-track model of habeas is nevertheless poorly designed. Sorting therefore does a poor job of
explaining bifurcated habeas review.
2. Sorting Between Tracks One and Two in Practice
I begin by asking how a petitioner shifts from Track One to
Track Two—that is, from likely dismissal to possible relief.
What signal, in other words, allows the leap from Track One,
which is the default channel for the majority of habeas petitioners, to Track Two? Recall that Track Two petitions are subject to
a threshold procedural bar, albeit one that has to be excused
under the cause-and-prejudice standard. Moreover, in the core
Track Two case, there is no state court adjudication on the merits to trigger AEDPA deference.192 Typically, this set of conditions will be satisfied when there is a concatenated failure to
press and adjudicate a constitutional claim—that is, a failure of
not just trial counsel and the trial court to successfully demonstrate constitutional error, but also appellate and postconviction
counsel and court.
Concatenated failures can start when a constitutional violation occurs at trial, and trial counsel fails to raise or preserve
the issue (such that there is no state court ruling). Alternatively,
they can begin with the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
This second possibility picks up a nontrivial slice of the federal
courts’ habeas docket. Indeed, empirical studies find that a majority of claims raised on federal habeas review turn in some
fashion upon ineffective assistance of trial counsel.193 (Ineffective
assistance is also the only way to raise a violation of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule on postconviction review194 although it is not clear this basis of habeas jurisdiction is especially

192 See 28 USC § 2254(d). If there is such a merits determination, the petitioner has
not left Track One.
193 King, Cheesman, Ostrom, Final Technical Report at *28 (cited in note 47) (finding that 50.4 percent of noncapital habeas cases contained one ineffective assistance
claim). See also Victor E. Flango, Habeas Corpus in State and Federal Courts *45–59
(1994), online at http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/criminal/id/0 (visited Dec 1, 2013); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth Circuit Capital Cases, 91 Cornell L Rev 1105, 1108 n 5 (2006).
194 Compare Kimmelman v Morrison, 477 US 365, 379–80 (1986) (allowing Sixth
Amendment claim on habeas to challenge failure to object to evidence that should have
been excluded), with Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1975) (barring direct litigation of
Fourth Amendment claims on habeas).
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significant in numerical terms.) Once a trial-level constitutional
error has occurred, whether based on the Sixth Amendment or
otherwise and gone unnoticed, it is generally the responsibility
of appellate or postconviction counsel to raise the claim and to
exhaust it. If a claim is properly presented at this stage, it will
be exhausted, and so teed up for Track One consideration. It is
only if there is yet another increment of ineffective assistance
that there might be a pathway through the procedural default
rule to reach federal-court consideration without the hobbling
AEDPA deference most habeas petitions receive. That is, in
most instances, it is a concatenation of errors in state court that
switches a case from Track One to Track Two.
Both Martinez v Ryan195 and Trevino v Thaler196 exemplify
this dynamic of track switching based on concatenated error. In
Martinez, trial counsel failed to challenge a critical piece of evidence, while appellate attorney, who also served as postconviction counsel, not only failed to raise the ensuing Sixth Amendment issue but also allegedly failed to notify Martinez of the
existence of his collateral proceeding.197 Similarly, in Trevino the
petitioner’s postconviction counsel failed to raise the question
whether the petitioner’s trial counsel had been ineffective by
failing to investigate and present mitigating factors in Trevino’s
capital sentencing hearing.198 Notice that in both Martinez and
Trevino, one can posit a counterfactual scenario in which the petitioner remained on Track One simply by raising the underlying constitutional claim on appeal or in a postconviction forum.
Had they done so, and had they secured a state court merits adjudication, the petitioners in those cases would have been channeled directly to a federal-court determination of whether the
state court ruling on the Sixth Amendment was unreasonable in
violation of AEDPA. The federal habeas court would never have
had an occasion to ask whether the quality of counsel in the
state postconviction context was sufficiently poor to qualify as
cause for the purpose of excusing a procedural default.
3. Sorting for Innocence
Concatenated error of the sort found in Martinez and Trevino is not obviously a signal of innocence rather than guilt. In195
196
197
198

132 S Ct at 1309.
133 S Ct at 1911.
132 S Ct at 1313–14.
133 S Ct at 1915–16.
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deed, it is possible to hypothesize as a threshold matter that
concatenated error involving ineffective counsel will be more
common in cases of actual guilt than in cases of actual innocence. If defense counsel accurately estimate guilt and innocence, they may exert more effort with clients they believe to be
actually innocent than with clients they believe guilty. On this
view, seriatim failures by counsel to invest in defenses might be
a proxy for underlying guilt. By contrast, when an actually innocent defendant is wrongly convicted it will tend to be despite
counsel’s substantial efforts, and hence within Track One’s unforgiving bounds. Hence, Track Two will perversely select for
guilty rather than innocent petitioners.
Alternatively, and perhaps more plausibly, state-funded defense counsel may often be so overloaded with cases that they
are unable to engage effectively in any sorting based on guilt
and innocence. Public defenders rarely have the luxury to engage in extensive (or perhaps any) investigation. Often, their
opportunities to meet with clients are abbreviated. Compounding the problem is variance in the quality of defense counsel.
Many defenders no doubt work diligently to maximize their aid
to clients, but it is surely unrealistic to expect that none of them
will ever slacken in their effort. Hence, it is likely plausible to
expect some poor lawyering, albeit in stochastically selected cases. As a result, ineffective counsel will likely be randomly distributed between innocent and guilty defendants.199 Under these
conditions, concatenated error would at best be an underinclusive proxy and at worst uncorrelated to innocence.
4. Sorting for Egregious Constitutional Error
What about the possibility that the Track One/Track Two
sorting has the effect of flagging egregious errors of state court
process rather than innocence? Superficially, this is not implausible. It is conceivable that there is a correlation between concatenated error on the part of counsel and judges in the state
court context and the occurrence of especially grave or compelling constitutional error. Moreover, this sorting effect aligns
Track Two with the very small class of cases in which relief is
warranted under the stringent definition of unreasonableness

199 I am grateful to Professors Brandon Garrett and Eric Freedman for helpful conversations on this point.
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articulated in Richter. Sorting for egregious error, therefore, superficially seems an attractive account of the jurisprudence.200
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to think that
the two-track model does not sort accurately for egregious errors
at the state court level. First, it is not sufficient for a petitioner
to have suffered from the seriatim failures of counsel and state
court to obtain Track Two relief. The complex procedural skein
of Track Two requires that a federal habeas petition explain how
the state court judicial hierarchy had been navigated, and then
show that this trajectory matches precisely the strictures of the
cause and prejudice gateway. The petition must also do so while
complying with the federal statute of limitations201 and abuse of
the writ rules.202 This pirouette will likely defeat many a smart
lawyer. It is likely to be beyond the reach of at least a substantial number of petitioners (even those able to mimic the surface
attributes of a previously successful petition).203
For these petitioners, who will often lack counsel at the federal habeas stage, Track Two may often be unreachable given
the epistemic transaction costs of litigation. Put otherwise, it
will often be the case that a petitioner will lack particularly diligent or careful counsel at the state court level and still lack such
counsel at the federal habeas stage—in which case Track Two
will be unavailing. It is also worth recalling, as discussed in Part
I, that there is an important class of cases in which poor lawyering at the state court level is followed by exceedingly good lawyering at the federal habeas level: death penalty cases.204
Second, and relatedly, the two-track model is likely to be
substantially underinclusive. Petitioners unable to access Track
Two will be subject to a second sorting mechanism, which occurs
within Track One. A substantial number of Track One claims
are never addressed on the merits, but resolved on procedural
grounds such as exhaustion, procedural default, untimeliness, or
successiveness. One study suggests such procedural dispositions

200 Note that this is not quite the same as encouraging defendants to treat state proceedings as the main event—to do this, it would suffice to abolish habeas without the
sort of distinctions currently drawn in the doctrine.
201 28 USC § 2244(d).
202 28 USC § 2244(b)(1)–(2).
203 For a counterexample, see Holland, 130 S Ct at 2556–57 (2010) (describing instance where petitioner got the law right, and his counsel did not).
204 See Liebman, 100 Colum L Rev at 2073 (cited in note 114).
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are the fate of a near-majority of all claims filed.205 Among the
pool of largely unrepresented petitioners, the threshold complexity of procedural rules likely selects those who are less familiar
with the rules for non-merits disposition.206 Consider, as an example of that complexity, the rule that for the purposes of
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, the time a petitioner expends
appealing a conviction directly to the US Supreme Court counts,
but the time spent appealing on writ of certiorari a denial of collateral relief does not.207 All else being equal, it will be the career
criminal, not the first-time offender, who successfully navigates
such rules.208 At least within Track One, it is possible that the
petitioners least able to navigate the criminal adjudicatory system and to employ intelligently their criminal procedural entitlements are also most likely to be dismissed at the threshold
rather than the merits. By contrast, sophisticated, if not necessarily more worthy, petitioners will thread the procedural maze
and reach merits consideration.209 In those cases, the federal
court may still have an opportunity to search for serious legal
error—at least until Richter and Pinholster combine over time to
rob even this review of any relief-generating potential. Hence,
the internal mechanisms of Track One are likely to obscure systematically the frequency of petitioners raising egregious errors
because those cases in which such errors are most likely to occur
are also least likely to be resolved on the merits.
Finally, notice an odd result that bears on the significance of
the Track One/Track Two distinction: A petitioner representing
himself who diligently raises a constitutional issue in the state
205 See King, Cheesman, and Ostrom, Final Technical Report at *45, (cited in note
47) (finding that 48 percent of petitions were dismissed wholly on procedural grounds).
206 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 49 Duke L J 947, 961 (2000) (noting that “procedural doctrines distinguish between defendants differently based on each defendant’s respective ability to navigate the procedural thicket, which has little or no bearing on that defendant’s substantive entitlement to relief”).
207 Compare Jimenez v Quarterman, 129 S Ct 681, 685–86 (2009) (direct appeal
rule), with Lawrence v Florida, 549 US 327, 337 (2007) (collateral review rule).
208 Moreover, conditions in most state prisons tend to pose a “serious threat to inmates’ health and safety.” Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 NYU L Rev 881, 888–89 (2009). Seasoned inmates are more likely to
adapt to such circumstances, and thus can exert more effort toward figuring out the
complexities of federal habeas. Prison is likely to be far more stressful for first-time and
new inmates. As a result of the ensuing mental and physical stress, it is more likely that
they will fail to account for the threshold complexities of federal habeas law.
209 It is hardly implausible to think that some habeas petitioners will be sophisticated. See, for example, Holland, 130 S Ct at 2549.
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postconviction context may be subject to the relatively hostile
regime of AEDPA deference. On the other hand, a petitioner
representing himself who has failed to raise an issue on state
postconviction review—and who can persuade the federal habeas court to treat his or her failure as excusing cause—secures a
more favorable standard of relief, and a more latitudinarian judicial attitude toward the evidentiary record. This raises the following question: under what circumstances, after Martinez and
Trevino, can a petitioner who represents himself or herself in
state postconviction proceedings plead the inefficacy of defense
counsel as an excuse for failing to raise an issue? Some elements
of the Court’s recent decisions suggest that failures of selfrepresentation can sometimes count as excusing cause.210 But it
is not clear how often this will be the case. Perhaps it is sufficient to say most failures of self-representation are “insubstantial,” and hence not enough to open the Track Two gateway.211
However the Court resolves this issue, the salient point here is
that the election between Track One and Track Two will often
depend on how effective self-representation is judged to be. In
this class of cases in particular, it is not clear how any rational
sorting either for egregious error or actual innocence will occur.
These three effects together render the two-track model of
habeas substantially underinclusive as a sorting mechanism for
identifying instances of egregious state court error. The separating equilibria produced by the two-track model of habeas, moreover, are also likely to have a distributive effect. The pool of cases that do reach merits consideration will largely comprise the
most serious alleged offenders (death penalty cases in Track
Two) and savvy serial offenders who know how to navigate both
prison life and the federal habeas maze, rather than the vulnerable or novices to the criminal justice system.212 Perverse sorting
effects in this vein are nothing alien to American criminal procedure. It has been argued that the Miranda warnings tend to
be exploited by career criminals and largely fail to aid the innocent, in effect sorting the most vulnerable for police interroga-

210

See Trevino, 133 S Ct at 1918.
Martinez, 132 S Ct at 1319.
212 This is not a unique consequence of signaling in the habeas context. For an account of how separating equilibria in the very difficult context of privacy law can have
distributive effects, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy
Law, 126 Harv L Rev 2010, 2032 (2013).
211
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tion.213 Similarly, prior to policing reforms in the 1960s and the
rise of professionalism, urban criminal justice systems were shot
though with corruption, abuse, and extortion—weak points that
were most easily exploited by career criminals.214 If habeas is to
be condemned for serving as a stepping stone for the strong and
an oubliette for the weak, therefore, it would not stand alone as
a uniquely perverse aspect of American criminal procedure.
Familiarity, however, should not breed complacency. It
might be objectionable to design a postconviction review system
to favor the sophisticated over the vulnerable however common
such an effect may be. Adding to the grounds for concern, the
two-track model’s distributive consequences may render habeas
politically fragile or unsustainable. The logic here borrows from
an argument made by Professor Akhil Amar in his work on the
Fourth Amendment: The exclusionary rule of Mapp v Ohio,215
notes Amar, treats guilty defendants as “a surrogate for the
larger public interest in restraining the government.”216 It also
directs judicial relief away from the actually innocent whose
Fourth Amendment rights are violated. In the long term, Amar
argues, this corrodes support for the underlying right.217
Substantially the same effect might be observed emanating
from the two-track model: By assigning relief to the sophisticated, and by failing to select for the vulnerable, habeas appears to
be—and indeed perhaps is—a device for rewarding the cunning
criminal at great expense to the public fisc, while leaving the
vulnerable behind bars. To be sure, resentment at habeas as an
instrument deployed by capital defendants is nothing new.218
213 See David Simon, Homicide: A Year on the Killing Streets 210 (Ivy 1991) (“Repetition and familiarity with the process soon place the professionals beyond the reach of a
police interrogation.”). For the leading study on this topic, see Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J Crim L & Criminol 621, 655 (1996) (explaining that Fifth
Amendment rights are most likely to be invoked by suspects who are repeat players in
the criminal justice system).
214 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Review, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 Mich L Rev 1045, 1053 (2013).
215 367 US 643 (1961) (incorporating the exclusionary rule against the states).
216 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv L Rev 757, 796
(1994).
217 See id at 799 (“In the popular mind, the Amendment has lost its luster and become associated with grinning criminals getting off on crummy technicalities. When rapists are freed, the people are less secure in their houses and persons—and they lose respect for the Fourth Amendment.”) (citation omitted).
218 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Selling a Quick Fix for Boot Hill: The Myth of Justice Delayed in Death Cases, in Austin Sarat, ed, The Killing State: Capital Punishment
in Law, Politics, and Culture 148, 165–69 (Oxford 1999) (explaining how some justices
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But the two-track model of habeas may be organized in such a
way as to confirm and even amplify such negative sentiments.
Over time, the operation of two-track habeas thus undermines
the political support necessary to maintain its successful operation.
***
It is at least possible to fit the two-track model of habeas to
the project of sorting for egregious state court error, if not for actual innocence. But such a defense is fragile. The two-track
model is substantially underinclusive as a sorting mechanism.
Instead, it will have perverse and likely undesirable distributive
consequences. Sorting theory thus fails to supply a satisfactory
explanation for the jurisprudence—at least if one assumes that
the Justices are even partially successful in promoting their
normative and policy goals through doctrinal articulations. To
understand what the Supreme Court is doing, therefore, we
must look elsewhere.
C. Habeas as Feedback Mechanism
A second potential explanation of two-track habeas focuses
on the incentives it fosters for judges, prosecutors, and petitioners in the state trial, appeals, and postconviction contexts. Federal court review, on this view, is warranted not simply because
it will intercept a substantial number of constitutional errors,219
but because it will change the behavior of participants in the

depended on a conception of the capital defense bar as “a tiny but immensely powerful
cabal of schemers” that manipulates the system to prevent the orderly implementation of
lawful sentences of death).
219 Early debates on post–Brown v Allen habeas focused on the value of this errorcorrection function. Compare Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 454 (cited in note 28) (arguing
that “if one set of institutions has been granted the task of finding the facts and applying
the law and does so in a manner rationally adapted to the task, in the absence of institutional or functional reasons to the contrary we should accept a presumption against mere
repetition of the process on the alleged ground that, after all, error could have occurred”),
with Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L J 1035, 1045 (1977) (arguing that jurisdictional redundancy
“fosters greater certainty that constitutional rights will not be erroneously denied”). The
argument from incentives errors, however, is more subtle than the argument from error
correction because it accounts for the possibility of dynamic interaction between state
and federal judiciaries. Professors Cover and Aleinikoff vaguely allude to this possibility
by praising the “dialogue” between state and federal courts initiated by habeas. 86 Yale
L J at 1052–54. They fail, however, to define with any precision the social welfare effects
of this dialogue.
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state court system in ways that deter future constitutional violations. That is, judges, prosecutors, and petitioners will anticipate the availability of federal habeas relief, and rationally
change their behavior to account for it in socially desirable ways.
To determine whether the two-track model of habeas can be
explained in these incentive-based terms, it is helpful to ask
first what sort of feedback mechanism might connect state and
federal judicial processes. This threshold inquiry turns out to be
more complex and contested than might first appear. I accordingly set forth two possible accounts of a feedback mechanism
linking state court criminal adjudications and federal postconviction review. While empirical testing of these accounts is beyond my mandate here, I suggest which seems to me most likely
to hold, and then assess its consequences for the two-track model.
1. A moral hazard theory of habeas
Postconviction habeas is characterized by some of its supporters as a safety net to minimize the net rate of uncorrected
constitutional error in state criminal adjudication.220 It is wellknown, however, that insurance often has unintended moral
hazard effects.221 Just as insurance against loss tends to reduce
incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss, so too insurance in the form of the federal exercise of postconviction review
may tend to reduce the precautionary care that state court judges take anticipating and mitigating deviations from constitutional desiderata.222 A theory of habeas as safety net, therefore,
must account for moral hazard in order to allocate habeas relief
in ways that do not yield ex ante incentives for state courts to
underinvest. I therefore start examining feedback-based explanations by looking at whether a theory of moral hazard might
explain the two-track model.

220

See, for example, Cover and Aleinikoff, 86 Yale L J at 1045–46 (cited in note

219).
221 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy 14 (Yale 1986) (“Moral hazard is the [ ] tendency of an insured to underallocate
to loss prevention after purchasing insurance.”).
222 State court trial judges may be better positioned to take precautions—and hence
would be subject to ex ante moral hazard—whereas state appeals and postconviction
judges would be able to mitigate, and hence would be subject to ex post moral hazard.
See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L J
1521, 1547 (1987) (developing the ex ante/ex post moral hazard distinction).
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A moral hazard theory of postconviction review requires at
least three empirical assumptions to hold in order to work. First,
the theory assumes that state judges, in the absence of judicial
reform, would tend to conform to constitutional criminal procedure rules. Constitutional violations, that is, must be a “consequence” that counts in state judges’ welfare function.223 If the
rate of constitutional violations is not of material consequence to
state judges, then no moral hazard effect will occur. Second, the
theory requires that judges be adequately positioned to take
precautions against a risk materializing.224 Finally, moral hazard arguments assume that the insured actor will respond to the
provision of insurance by lowering the level of care exercised.225
If all these elements hold and moral hazard is substantial, then
habeas relief would be allocated so as to maximize error correction without producing an aggregate higher rate of error at the
state court stage.
A variant on the moral hazard argument was tendered by
Professor Paul Bator, who opined that “nothing [is] more subversive of a judge’s sense of responsibility . . . than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be
called by someone else.”226 I do not rely on Bator’s psychologicalized account of moral hazard here for two reasons. First, Bator
provided no evidence of demoralization effects among state court
judges, and did not explain why those judges would not instead
be grateful for the implicit reduction in workload. Accordingly,
his argument is little more than a naked hypothesis. Second,
Bator did not explain why state court judges differ from other
agents in judicial hierarchies (for example, magistrate judges,
bankruptcy judges, federal district court judges, federal law
clerks) whose work is equally subject to revision. If Bator’s argument held true, demoralization would be a widely observed effect of hierarchical control mechanisms. Because there is little

223 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral
Hazard, 8 Geneva Papers on Risk & Ins 4, 6 (1983) (“[T]he more and better insurance
that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to avoid
the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of their actions.”).
224 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex L Rev 237, 279
(1996) (“If the people exposed to the insurance incentive are not in control of the behavior that matters, then reducing the insurance incentive will impose a cost on those people while providing little benefit in the way of reduced accidents.”).
225 See id at 285–86 (noting that this does not occur with workers’ compensation
schemes).
226 Bator, 76 Harv L Rev at 451 (cited in note 28).
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evidence this is so there is scant cause to credit Bator’s hypothesis.
Setting aside Bator’s unreliable iteration of the argument,
the moral hazard theory of postconviction review initially seems
a promising candidate for explaining the two-track structure of
current doctrine. To begin with, the Supreme Court commonly
justifies new restraints on habeas review by conjuring a “comity”
value in threshold state court determination of constitutional
questions.227 Demanding initial review in a state court would
make little sense if the Court believed state courts did not prefer
compliance with federal constitutional norms.228 Further, recall
that Track Two selects for closer scrutiny those cases in which
there has been concatenated error of some sort.229 Typically, although not inevitably, this involves the serial failure of effective
defense representation, which will obviate the possibility of a
state court passing on a constitutional issue. Hence, Track Two’s
intensification of federal-court consideration likely correlates
with the incidence of cases in which a state court has had no effective chance to rule on a constitutional question—that is, cases
in which there is no potential for moral hazard.230 If the Court is
selecting these cases for more intensive review, then it is picking
out precisely those proceedings in which the moral hazard feedback effect will be the slightest. Stated otherwise, the Track

227 See, for example, O’Sullivan v Boerckel, 526 US 838, 844–45 (1999); Rose v Lundy, 455 US 509, 515–16 (1982). The Court often justifies comity concerns by citing the
need for reducing “friction” between state and federal judiciaries. O’Sullivan, 526 US at
844–45. It is not clear what the Court means by this. It does not obviously make sense to
talk of “friction between courts” in the same way as “friction between nations” is a meaningful concept. Unlike governments, courts do not stand in relations of amity or enmity
toward each other—or at least not in common parlance. Moreover, the idea that federal
courts are hierarchically superior to state courts with respect to federal law has been intricated into the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction since Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) at
304 (1816). Consider also the possibility of removal from state court and the common use
of stays in bankruptcy litigation to freeze state court proceedings. Given this extensive
range of judicial contact points, it is not at all clear why the Court should single out habeas as a unique source of intergovernmental friction.
228 Indeed, for at least two decades, “[t]he Court has been saying . . . that state
courts are to be trusted with claims of constitutional right.” Barry Friedman, Habeas
and Hubris, 45 Vand L Rev 797, 818 (1992).
229 See text accompanying notes 193–195.
230 Why not remand to state court for further review even in Track Two cases? See
Rhines v Weber, 544 US 269, 275–77 (2005) (recognizing district court authority to issue
stays to allow petitioners to return to state court “in limited circumstances”). A partial,
but rather unsatisfactory, answer is that after so much litigation, the remand may be an
“unwelcome burden” on state courts. O’Sullivan, 526 US at 847. If moral hazard indeed
explained habeas jurisprudence, a Rhines stay might be the optimal tool in all cases.
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One/Track Two distinction might be a way to provide some federal relief for constitutional claims, but only when doing so catalyzes no deleterious moral hazard effect.
In other respects, however, the specific workings of Track
One can be aligned with a moral hazard theory of habeas only
with some awkwardness. At least in regard to petitioners able to
navigate habeas’s procedural shoals, courts within Track One
allot relief only to egregious deviations from constitutional
norms known to state courts.231 This is not an effective strategy
to dampen moral hazard, even if it is effective if one seeks a deterrence effect.232 Consider a somewhat mundane analogy to illuminate this point: To mitigate moral hazard ordinarily, an insurer will typically demand that an insured exercise some
minimal level of care (for example, the use of a fire alarm or an
antitheft device on a car), and will not pay when the insured
fails to take such threshold precautions.233 The insurer does not,
however, require the owner to take very costly prophylactic
measures (for example, never taking a vehicle from a locked
garage) in order to warrant a payout. Moral hazard, that is, is
mitigated by making the exercise of some care a precondition to
insurance. If the organizing principle of habeas doctrine was the
minimization of moral hazard, then federal courts would not
step in when state courts failed to take any care at all (in other
words, when they invested in an inefficiently low level of precautions). By contrast, they would step in to provide a safety net
when a state court has taken reasonable precautions, but an erroneous outcome has nonetheless slipped through the net.
Rather strikingly, this is basically the inverse of the current
habeas regime. At present, federal courts provide “insurance” (in
other words, they correct errors of constitutional dimension)
when a state court has made an unreasonable mistake, but not
when the error is a reasonable one.234 If the organizing principle
of two-track habeas were the mitigation of moral hazard, federal
judges would be obligated to behave in roughly the opposite
231

See text accompanying notes 65–67.
See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J Legal Stud 307, 309 (1994) (“[G]reater accuracy is valuable [as a deterrent] only
to the extent it involves dimensions about which individuals are informed at the time
they act.”).
233 See Baker, 75 Tex L Rev at 280–81 (cited in note 224) (“Insurance is often conditioned on ‘care.’ . . . Examples include requirements for anti-theft devices, smoke alarms,
and sprinkler systems.”).
234 See 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
232
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fashion: habeas relief should be unavailable when constitutional
errors were obvious and easily avoided, but readily available only when such errors could be mitigated by exerting an extremely
high degree of care. Paradoxically, therefore, Track One seems
designed to court, not dampen, moral hazard at least along this
dimension.
Even aside from this problem (which is internal to Track
One), there is some reason to be skeptical that the moral hazard
theory can explain the distinction between Track One and Track
Two. None of the three empirical predicates of moral hazard
theory are obviously true. Without an exceptional feat of analytic fiat, therefore, the two-track model cannot be justified as empirically warranted. The first factual predicate of a moral hazard
theory—that state judges value constitutional entitlements as
opposed to, say, populist retributivist goals—is in tension with
available empirical evidence. Eighty-nine percent of state judges
face voters in some form of election, whether for appointment or
retention.235 Most empirical studies show that these judges are
strongly influenced by factors other than legal norms in criminal
cases. Elections have statistically significant influence on sentencing generally and on capital cases in particular. Elected
judges tend to impose higher sentences before retention votes.236
Judicial elections, whether partisan or nonpartisan, “are affected by candidate- and issue-based forces.”237 Anecdotal evidence
of state courts depicts an equally glum picture of incompetence

235 Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 Georgetown L
J 1077, 1105 (2007).
236 See Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am J Polit Sci 247, 261 (2004); Sanford C.
Gordon and Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent
Behavior, 2 Q J Polit Sci 107, 133 (2007).
237 Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the
Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 Am Polit Sci Rev 315, 326 (2001). See also Joanna M.
Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 Duke L J 623, 629 (2009) (finding
that “unlike judges facing retention decisions, judges who do not need to appeal to voters
shape their rulings to voters’ preferences less. For example, voters’ politics has little effect on the rulings of judges with permanent tenure or who plan to retire before the next
election”); Melinda Gann Hall and Paul Brace, Justices’ Responses to Case Facts: An Interactive Model, 24 Am Polit Q 237, 255 (1996) (finding that judges facing partisan elections are less likely to dissent on politically controversial issues). One study not specific
to the criminal law context finds no evidence of judicial responses to political pressure.
See Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians:
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J L
Econ & Org 290, 326–28 (2008).
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compounded with animus.238 In the capital context, studies find
a strong link between ambient public support for capital punishment and the likelihood of a capital sentence.239
To be clear, this evidence does not show that state judges
will systematically or persistently disregard constitutional
norms, but it suggests they are highly alert to public demands
for punitive action, which are likely in tension with constitutional rules. This evidence hence raises the question whether
the downstream prospect of federal habeas review can be assumed to suppress compliance with those norms. If elected judges anticipate elective discipline by a public with punitive preferences, they may already be relatively indifferent to the rate of
constitutional compliance at the margin. The prospect of downstream habeas relief may have little suppressive effect. At a
minimum, it seems hasty to structure postconviction review
around the prospect of moral hazard when the magnitude of
feedback effects might be trivial.
Respecting the second and third predicates of moral hazard
theory, state judges’ capacity to take precautions in response to
federal habeas rulings may be importantly constrained. Of
course, trial and appellate judges can vary in their attentiveness
to constitutional claims, and may be more or less willing to take
note of sua sponte transgressions by the government.240 But the
state judiciary’s capacity to mitigate systemic constitutional violations may be limited such that feedback effects from federal
habeas cannot be assumed. To perceive the limits of judicial precautions, consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claims
that comprise a large share of federal habeas actions. Commentators have identified “rampant underfunding of noncapital defense” as a barrier to general vindication of Sixth Amendment
rights.241 Publicly funded defense lawyers are not only poorly

238 See, for example, William Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlasted Many Critics, NY Times A1 (Sept 27, 2006) (discussing the “long trail of injustices and
mangled rulings” associated with the local court system); William Glaberson, In Tiny
Courts of New York, Abuses of Law and Power, NY Times A1 (Sept 25, 2006).
239 See, for example, Paul Brace and Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the
Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 Am J Polit Sci 360, 370 (2008).
240 State judges cannot obviously diminish care with respect to hidden violations,
such as violations of Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963).
241 Benjamin H. Barton and Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding
and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U Pa L Rev 967, 974 (2012). See generally Karen
Houppert, Chasing Gideon: The Elusive Quest for Poor People’s Justice (New Press
2013).

HABEAS HUQ SSRN (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Habeas and the Roberts Court

3/7/2014 12:46 PM

157

compensated242 but also lack resources to conduct adequate investigations243 and often labor under astonishing caseloads.244
State court judges may be able to respond to the most extreme
cases of ineffective assistance by appointing new counsel. But
they are poorly situated to respond to endemic underfunding
that underwrites many violations of the Sixth Amendment currently.245 Unlike state judges, state legislators who do control
funding levels are unlikely to be vulnerable to moral hazard
from federal habeas.246
The inelasticity of indigent-defense underfunding to outcomes in postconviction review directly undermines the descriptive plausibility of a moral hazard theory of federal habeas. But
it also has an indirect effect: state court judges necessarily rely
on defense counsel to identify constitutional questions. Inadequate funding and overwhelming caseloads blunt defense counsel’s ability to flag constitutional questions. Subject to lopsided
epistemic updating from defense and prosecution,247 state judges
may be in no position to identify, let alone remedy, the full panoply of constitutional concerns implicated in a given case. The
moral hazard effect of habeas under these circumstances may be
limited.
Even though the Track One/Track Two distinction can be
explained in terms of moral hazard, in sum, the case for anticipating nontrivial moral hazard effects from federal postconvic242 See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 Mo L Rev 907, 912–
13 (2010). The situation in capital cases is no better. See Adam M. Gershowitz,
Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death
Penalty, 63 Vand L Rev 307, 323–26 (2010).
243 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U Ill L Rev 53, 76–77 & n 158 (noting underfunding of expert assistance for indigent defendants).
244 See Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 895 (cited in note 10).
245 Efforts to obtain injunctions under state constitutions requiring better indigentdefense funding have generally failed. See, for example, Quitman County v State, 910
S2d 1032, 1048 (Miss 2005); State v Peart, 621 S2d 780, 785–92 (La 1993).
246 Generalizations here—as in much of this analysis—are hazardous. In New York
State, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman has been instrumental in securing increased defense funding. See Law Day Remarks by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, (NY Courts
May 1, 2013), online at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/lawday13trans.pdf (visited Dec 3,
2013). It is surely regrettable that Chief Judge Lippman’s concern with constitutional
compliance appears to be the exception, and not the rule.
247 See Barton and Bibas, 160 U Pa L Rev at 975–76 (cited in note 241) (noting
asymmetry, and explaining that “[f]elony defenders also have little time to meet with
their clients. . . . Their only communication with each client may be no more than a hurried conversation in a courtroom hallway or holding cell in the few minutes before a
court appearance”).
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tion review is fragile. To the extent that habeas is intended to
diminish the net frequency of constitutional violations, therefore, it is not clear that any scaling back based on moral hazard
concerns is warranted. It follows that the theory does not provide a plausible explanation of what the Court is doing in its
two-track habeas jurisprudence.
2. The “sentinel effect” of habeas
An alternative feedback mechanism linking state court process and federal habeas is a “sentinel effect,” whereby the prospect of subsequent review induces greater care on the part of
the front-line decision-maker.248 The possibility of a sentinel effect was first identified in the medical literature, where it generated a justification for securing of second opinions on recommended surgeries as a means toward reducing the number of
unnecessary interventions.249 In the habeas context, the argument would be that the prospect of later review for constitutional error induces greater care on the part of state judges. Judges
would have to be motivated by a preference for not being contradicted by a federal judge, and would have a sufficiently low discount rate so as to be motivated by the specter of federal habeas
relief. (Note that this is the opposite assumption to the one underpinning a moral hazard theory of habeas, which posits that
state judges dial down efforts when their errors are fixed in subsequent federal collateral review.) The allocation to petitioners
of the decision to invoke habeas, additionally, would increase the
chance that postconviction review would pick up instances of
false positives in state adjudications.250
The two-track model of habeas cannot, however, be explained in terms of sentinel effects or like deterrence-based accounts.251 If federal invigilation of constitutional compliance in
248 Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 Va L Rev 1435,
1464 (2011).
249 See Suzanne Grisez Martin, et al, Impact of a Mandatory Second-Opinion Program on Medicaid Surgery Rates, 20 Med Care 21, 31–32 (1982).
250 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J
Legal Stud 379, 381 (1995) (arguing for investments in appellate review rather than a
better trial process, because “litigants possess information about the occurrence of error
and appeals courts can frequently verify it”).
251 The doctrine, though, creates obviously powerful incentives for habeas petitioners to turn square corners in state court. For two reasons, it is doubtful this feedback
effect is effectual. First, it is hardly clear that noncapital petitioners have any significant
incentive to engage in strategic deferment (or sandbagging) in the first place. See Morrison, 477 US at 382 n 7. Second, the sanctioning of petitioners based on defaults by omis-
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state criminal adjudication increased compliance rates with the
relevant rights, then the two-track model has matters exactly
backwards. At present, the intensity of federal review is greatest
when state courts have not had an opportunity to pass on a legal
question. By contrast, adjudication of a claim on either substantive or procedural grounds moves a claim into Track One, where
a state judge’s reasoning is likely to receive little or no scrutiny.
Within Track One, the doctrine elicits reductions in state
judges’ care respecting constitutional error. The treatment of
summary opinions as merits judgments,252 for example, effectively imposes a tax on reasoned adjudication by state courts. Confronting a summary opinion, a habeas petitioner must address
all potential reasonable explanations of the outcome in order to
secure relief.253 By contrast, a reasoned opinion narrows the field
of potential explanations, giving the petitioner a precise target.
State judges seeking insulation from reversal have a new reason
to expend less, rather than more, work on drafting opinion. A
similar dynamic logic operates in respect to Pinholster’s new
constraints on the evidentiary basis of merits review.254 By limiting merits review to the record before the state court that adjudicated a constitutional claim, the Court encourages state courts
to be chary in their admissibility and discovery decisions255 even
as it “places an extraordinary premium on effective fact development at the state level.”256 By imposing strict limits on a defendant’s ability to introduce exculpatory or mitigating evidence
through “independent and adequate”257 time limits, state courts
can further buffer themselves from habeas’s sentinel effect. Retail decisions to deny expansions of the record, which since 2009
have been treated as adequate and independent procedural

sion in state court is unlikely to have much effect on state-funded defense counsel, who
do not bear those costs. Only by imposing a formalist model of agency between petitioner
and counsel—a formalism that flies in the teeth of the available empirical evidence—
does this deterrence mechanism even begin to make sense.
252 See Richter, 131 S Ct at 784–85.
253 See text accompanying notes 85–92.
254 See Pinholster, 131 S Ct at 1388 (2011).
255 See, for example, Wiseman, 53 BC L Rev at 968–71 (cited in note 12) (showing
how Pinholster has changed the evidentiary demands that federal habeas courts place on
their state counterparts).
256 Id at 972. A different issue is presented if a petitioner seeks factual development
in the state court and is denied.
257 Coleman, 501 US at 729.
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bars,258 may further conduce to a diminished prospect of effective
collateral review.
Rather than having a benevolent sentinel effect, therefore,
two-track habeas may undermine observable signals of state
criminal adjudications’ quality. The basic insight here was powerfully articulated by the late Professor William Stuntz. He observed that procedural constraints on law enforcement “[create]
a series of political taxes and subsidies, making some kinds of
legislation and law enforcement more expensive and others
cheaper.”259 As a result, Stuntz argued, criminal procedure rules
often had perverse effects because they leave “[p]oliticians [ ]
freest to regulate where regulation is most likely to be one-sided
and punitive.”260 Two-track habeas is akin to other forms of regulation in that it makes one activity more costly than an obvious
substitute. The taxed activity here is careful adjudication of constitutional criminal procedure issues. The obvious and readily
available substitute is less attentive adjudication. Richter and
Pinholster, that is, are subsidies for constitutional slovenliness.
In a sense, the two-track model’s incentive effects stand in
opposition to the incentive effects that Stuntz inveighed against.
But it is important to see that the two sets of incentives (those
identified in Stuntz’s pathmarking work and those elaborated
here) do not offset each other. Stuntz argued that the response
to Warren Court criminal procedure rules was greater punitiveness in criminal legislation and sentencing.261 But the inflationary dynamic of criminal penalties and sentencing has already
occurred: the operation of two-track habeas today does nothing
to mitigate the “pathological” punitiveness to which Stuntz objected for the simple reason that its effects occur only after state
legislatures have ramped up the scope and weight of criminal

258 See Beard v Kindler, 130 S Ct 612, 618 (2009) (holding that “a discretionary
state procedural rule can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal habeas review”).
259 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv L
Rev 781, 782 (2006). See also William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1265, 1274 (1999) (arguing that criminal procedure rules
“[act] as a tax, a mechanism for making some activities more expensive relative to their
substitutes”).
260 Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev at 783 (cited in note 259). See also William J. Stuntz,
Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 Colum L Rev 1795, 1819–24 (1998) (developing the perverseeffects argument in respect to the Fourth Amendment).
261 See Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev at 802 (cited in note 259) (explaining how constitutional criminal procedure has “encourage[d] legislatures to expand criminal codes and to
enact tougher sentencing rules”).
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law.262 Hence, it seems likely that two-track habeas will exacerbate overcriminalization and punitive sentencing policies by
making convictions easier to obtain.
Of course, this assumes feedback is indeed transmitted between state and federal judiciaries via habeas relief. But this requires “that the low habeas grant rate [ ] reflects the effective
deterrence of constitutional violations by the threat of habeas
review.”263 It may instead be, as Hoffman and King suggest, that
most sentences are too short to allow habeas review; that defendants waive access to collateral relief in plea bargains; that
state court evidentiary records are unlikely to support Sixth
Amendment relief; and that federal intervention is too “infrequent” to have any deterrent effect.264 These arguments, however, do not undermine the possibility of perverse feedback effects.
To the contrary, the first two points made by Hoffman and King
in fact may reflect state courts’ efforts to avoid federal habeas
review by awarding shorter sentences and encouraging pleabargained waivers. They are consistent, that is, with the existence of feedback effects.
Their last two points are also consistent with the perverse
feedback effects I have identified. Scantier evidentiary records,
summary decisions, and low rates of relief are all consequences
of the specific contours of two-track habeas because they might
reflect strategies deployed by state judges to minimize the tax
imposed by federal habeas review by finding less observable
ways to continue dubiously constitutional modalities of criminal
adjudication. They are efforts to vitiate its substance if not
evade it entirely.
Sentinel effects, in sum, provide little justification for the
two-track habeas model. Rather, attention to how the incentive
effects of postconviction review are distributed suggests that the
model has undesirable, even perverse, social welfare effects.

262 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich L Rev 505 (2001).
263 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 810 (cited in note 7).
264 Id at 810–11. Hoffmann and King are not entirely consistent on this point. They
elsewhere argue that wholesale reform of federal habeas, which they propose, might
tempt states into “reducing or eliminating their own postconviction review procedures.”
Id at 835. In this passage, Hoffmann and King suggest that federal habeas has a deterrence effect in regard to state procedural safeguards. This seems in tension with their
skepticism elsewhere of deterrence effects.
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***
Two kinds of feedback mechanisms can be posited as justifications for two-track habeas. A moral hazard theory would justify the bifurcated structure of the current doctrine. A sentinel effect theory would not. The empirical presuppositions of moral
hazard theory, however, are not satisfied. And attention to sentinel effects reveals a potential for perverse consequences given
prevailing rules. No less than sorting theories, theories based on
feedback loops provide no compelling normative warrant for the
doctrinal status quo.
D. Habeas and the Distribution of Constitutional Fault
A third possible account of the two-track model of habeas focuses on the role of fault as a key to constitutional remedies. On
this view, two-track habeas is a mechanism to identify the
tranche of cases in which there is a large asymmetry in fault between the petitioner and the state. Only by demonstrating his or
her own exceptional blamelessness (in Track Two) or the exceptional blameworthiness of the state (in Track One) can a petitioner succeed in securing relief from a federal habeas court. On
this account, postconviction jurisprudence has moved into
alignment with its remedial kin—the law of constitutional tort.
1. Fault as lodestar.
A threshold reason to take fault seriously as a key to understanding the two-track model of habeas is the organizing principle that it plays in other domains of constitutional remedial doctrine. With the exception of municipal liability,265 the absolute
immunity of states and state agencies266 means that a constitutional tort plaintiff must sue state officials in their individual
capacities in order to secure money damages based on a constitutional tort.267 Officials, however, are “protected by qualified
immunity, a fault-based standard approximating negligence as
to illegality.”268 Over time, the liability rule has gone “well be265 See Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 US 658,
701 (1978) (holding that municipalities can be sued under 42 USC § 1983); Owen v City
of Independence, 445 US 622, 638 (1980) (imposing strict liability on municipalities). But
see City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 271 (1981) (holding that municipalities are absolutely immune from punitive damages).
266 See Will v Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 65–66, 71 (1989).
267 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 807–08, 815 (1982).
268 Jeffries, 99 Va L Rev at 208 (cited in note 30).
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yond shielding reasonable error” to demand a showing akin to
“gross negligence.”269 Fault terminology also leaks into the
Fourth Amendment context, where the invalidity of a warrant
no longer requires exclusion unless an officer acts with “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” or with “recurring or
systemic negligence.”270 In perhaps the most influential work on
constitutional tort, Professor John Jeffries has suggested that
the centrality of fault is best explained in terms of a “noninstrumental conception” of corrective justice, according to which
“fault supplies [a justifying] moral dimension” for the “restorative transfer from wrongdoer to victim.”271
At first blush, the concept of fault seems to run substantially into the concept of egregious constitutional error discussed
earlier in this Part. But they are not quite the same. Fault, unlike error, is a relational context insofar as it provides the foundation for a “restorative transfer.” As I use the term here, it implies an asymmetry between the petitioner and the state that
yields distinct normative evaluations. The asymmetry is wanting when a grievous constitutional error is made, but the petitioner egregiously fails to press and seek timely judicial consideration of that error. Fault, again in line with how I will use the
term, can also be established with a greater variety of tools than
a mere showing of one-sided egregious constitutional error. It
can also be established by showing an ordinary error coupled
with an exceptional degree of blamelessness on the petitioner’s
part.
To a startling degree, this symmetrical, moralized conception of fault fits well with the observed doctrinal contours of twotrack habeas. To begin with, within Track One it is tolerably
clear that a petitioner cannot secure relief without a showing of
269 Id at 258 (“Whatever the label, qualified immunity has evolved toward an overly
legalistic and therefore overly protective shield against liability for constitutional
torts.”).
270 Herring v United States, 129 S Ct 695, 702 (2009). See also Davis v United
States, 131 S Ct 2419, 2423–24 (2011); United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 913 (1984)
(recognizing good-faith exception to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule when officers
reasonably rely on faulty warrant). Some commentators argue that Herring and Leon
represent leakage from the constitutional tort context too. See, for example, Jennifer E.
Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111
Colum L Rev 670, 706 (2011) (suggesting the Court’s impetus for “conceiving of the exclusionary rule as a remedy premised upon fault and desert” derives from constitutional
tort doctrine).
271 John C. Jeffries Jr, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the
Significance of Fault, 88 Mich L Rev 82, 93–95 (1989).
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extraordinary fault—one might even say “deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent conduct”272—on the part of a state court. The
alignment of Track One with fault concepts is amplified by the
tailored scope of the habeas court’s inquiry: after AEDPA as
modified by Pinholster, the federal habeas court is constrained
not only to the universe of Supreme Court cases that obtained at
the precise moment at which a state court rendered the relevant
judgment, but also to the four corners of record before that court.
This is so however powerful the petitioner’s reasons for omitting
evidence, and however compelling that evidence might be. It
hardly makes sense to impose these limitations on a federal
court in searching for constitutional error or innocence, or seeking to optimize the state court’s incentives. To the contrary, a
leading economic theory of appellate review points out that it is
precisely the fact that appeals may select for “the subset of cases
in which errors were more probably made” and may allow appellants to flag those errors that makes such second opinions
worthwhile.273 The observed limitations on habeas relief, though,
comfortably fit with the judicial labor of winnowing out extraordinarily wrongful state court decisions.274
Fault also helps explain the asymmetric treatment of litigation error on the part of petitioners and the state within Track
One. For example, whereas state miscalculations of AEDPA’s
complex timeliness rule are treated with leniency,275 petitioner
and defense counsel errors (such as mistakenly filing in federal
rather than state court first) are viewed with Spartan disdain.276
This is so even if most petitioner errors are more fairly described
as the errors of (state-selected and state-funded) counsel.277 Yet
little short of abandonment by counsel seems sufficient to warrant extenuation of Track One’s procedural rigors.278 At least su272

Herring, 129 S Ct at 702.
Shavell, 24 J Legal Stud at 381 (cited in note 250).
274 After Martinez and Trevino, this includes both state trial courts and state collateral review.
275 See Day, 547 at 208–09.Deliberate state forfeitures, by contrast, are subject to a
more unforgiving rule. See Wood v Milyard, 132 S Ct 1826, 1830 (2012).
276 See Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 180 (2001) (emphasizing the need to incentivize petitioner compliance with AEDPA’s statute of limitations). See also Pace v DiGuglielmo, 544 US 408, 427 (2005) (Stevens dissenting).
277 For a rare instance of judicial attention to that question, see Dunphy v McKee,
134 F3d 1297, 1299 (7th Cir 1998).
278 See Maples v Thomas, 132 S Ct 912, 922 (2012) (stressing that mere negligence
by defense counsel will not excuse a procedural default). For a criticism of the pinched
view of equitable discretion evinced in Maples, see Adam Liptak, Agency and Equity:
273
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perficially, this distribution of equitable relief from litigation error seems perverse. The state, after all, is the repeat player, and
so is better able to internalize knowledge of the complexities of
habeas law. Habeas petitioners, by contrast, are typically uncounseled, often one-shot players (at least outside the capital
context, where counsel is more often available): they are more
likely to be subject to cognitive and epistemic constraints than
the state’s lawyers. To extenuate the former, but not the latter,
only makes sense if the habeas court’s ultimate touchstone is the
presence of extraordinary fault by the state.
A related conception of fault animates Track Two. Here, an
exceptional measure of blamelessness—in the form of concatenated error and the seriatim failure to address a petitioner’s
constitutional claims—opens the door to serious consideration of
the state’s omission or error, which need not be so grave in magnitude. To be sure, concatenated error can occur without any
fault on the state’s part.279 But there Track Two petitioners must
in effect again demonstrate a large gap between their own
blamelessness and the state’s conduct. In Professor Anthony
Amsterdam’s words, they must show conformity with “a standard that can only be described as the squeaky clean test.”280
Even having navigated the serial showings necessary to enter
Track Two, a petitioner must still demonstrate some degree of
fault on a state court’s part. At a minimum, the petitioner must
still point to a constitutional error281 and then overcome both the
harmless error standard282 and the general rule against retroactive application of constitutional rules.283 Hence, Track Two

Why Do We Blame Clients for their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 110 Mich L Rev 875, 885 (2012)
(“Agency principles can only do so much work, and at some point equity must matter,
too.”).
279 Justice Alito makes this point in his Maples concurrence, where he notes that
gross attorney error can occur regardless of the specifics of the state’s scheme for appointing counsel to indigent defendants. Maples, 132 S Ct at 928–29 (Alito concurring).
280 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the
Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Nov 22, 2004, 33 Hofstra L Rev 403, 411 (2004).
281 See 28 USC §§ 2243, 2254(a) (predicating habeas relief on a violation of the US
Constitution, laws, or treaties).
282 See Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993). Strickland and Brady claims,
though, already require a showing of prejudice in order to obtain relief, making Brecht
less significant.
283 Formally, the nonretroactivity rule of the plurality in Teague v Lane, 489 US
288, 310 (1989), would apply even after a petitioner passes through the Track Two gateways to reach the merits. For an example of the stringency with which Teague is applied,
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might be understood to treat the extraordinary blamelessness of
the petitioner as a substitute for the supernumerary demand for
fault that is levied in Track One.
In short, the Court has imported the idea of fault-based limitations in suits against the state by habeas petitioners from the
context of suits against the state by constitutional tort plaintiffs.
The pivotal concept of fault, to be sure, is not clearly stated in
the jurisprudence, and is ambiguous in its precise application.
Nevertheless, it can be understood to pick out instances of egregious noncompliance with a relevant rule or standard, while
leaving open how to calibrate egregiousness and how to treat
cases of bilateral fault.
2. Why fault?
Why, though, should fault provide a lodestar to guide the
doctrinal development of postconviction habeas? A threshold
possibility might build on Professor Richard Fallon’s “Equilibration Thesis,” which posits that “courts, and especially the Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines involving justiciability,
substantive rights, and available remedies.”284 With the exception of some species of equitably titrated injunctive relief, the
Court seems to have installed a transubstantive rule of fault on
remedies that conjoins constitutional tort rules and habeas.285
Private plaintiffs seeking divergent remedies—whether it be the
exclusion of inculpatory evidence, money damages, or vacatur of
a state court conviction—must confront and overcome the same
bar to liability.
But if this strategy is long on consistency, it is not clear
what else recommends it. Perhaps habeas, suppression, and
money damages are pure substitutes for a small domain of
Fourth Amendment violations, but they do not generally operate
as natural alternatives. There is hence no reason to enforce re-

see Horn v Banks, 536 US 266, 271 (2002) (holding that Teague can apply even when the
state court ignores that rule).
284 Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Linkage between Justiciability and Remedies—And
Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 Va L Rev 633, 637 (2006).
285 I have argued elsewhere that transubstantive spillover effects have an important
causal role in doctrinal development in public law. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Against
National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 S Ct Rev 225.
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medial conformity to limit litigant gamesmanship.286 The reasons commonly adduced for a fault-centered jurisprudence of
constitutional tort law cannot be straightforwardly translated
over to the habeas context. Qualified immunity has been justified, for example, by the concern that courts would otherwise
hesitate before expanding constitutional rights.287 The same justification does not apply to the habeas context. Long before the
development of two-track habeas, the Court in Teague v Lane,288
imposed a nonretroactivity rule on federal collateral review that
obviates any friction on doctrinal evolution by imposing, in effect, a fault standard on state courts.289 Teague’s nonretroactivity rule is an early incarnation of fault’s role in habeas. And
Teague could have been the limit of fault’s relevance. As Justice
Stevens emphasized in his plurality opinion in Terry Williams,
AEDPA’s standard of review for legal error could quite plausibly
have been read as codifying the Teague rule.290 Of course, Justice
Stevens did not command a majority in Terry Williams. Instead,
the more onerous standard initially adopted by Justice O’Connor
has been entrenched and even reinforced by Richter.291 The ensuing overlay of two-track habeas on Teague arguably adds little
marginal insulation that might promote legal change.292 To the
contrary, two-track habeas may have a net retarding effect on
doctrinal development by limiting opportunities for doctrinal development to the context of direct review of state supreme court
judgments293—a context, of course, where not all constitutional
errors will be in evidence.294

286 The problem of gamesmanship animates the Court’s treatment of the overlap
between habeas and 42 USC § 1983. See, for example, Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477,
481–82 (1994).
287 See John C. Jeffries Jr, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale
L J 87, 98–100 (1999).
288 489 US 288 (1989).
289 Id at 288 (1989) (plurality).
290 See Terry Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362, 384–90 & n 14 (2000) (plurality).
291 See text accompanying notes 68–90.
292 This is quite aside from the question of whether the Roberts Court seeks breathing room to expand criminal procedure entitlements—a supposition that might reasonably be doubted.
293 The Court could begin accepting more certiorari petitions from state postconviction judgments. See generally Giovanna Shay and Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New
Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari
from Judgments of State Courts, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev 211 (2008). This has not happened yet.
294 Both doctrines provide for resolution of a case in the state’s favor without reaching a ruling on the precise contours of the underlying law. See Stephen I. Vladeck,
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Nor is it possible to transpose the other leading account of
qualified immunity to the habeas context. This account insists
on the need to liberate state officials to “act upon their own free,
unbiased convictions, uninfluenced by any apprehensions.”295
This account rests on the observation that officials typically do
not internalize all positive externalities from their decisions,
and a liability rule forcing them to internalize negative externalities would create an undesirable asymmetry in incentives and
so lower levels of desirable government action.296 There is no
parallel asymmetry, though, in the habeas context. Judges do
not internalize the cost of habeas relief (as opposed to the costs
of habeas adjudication) in the same way they might internalize
money damages remedies. Even a strict liability rule on collateral review would engender no asymmetrical incentives concern.
Hence, the reasons normally offered for a tort rule for constitutional remedies do not easily translate to the habeas context.
It is not possible to adduce a decisive explanation for the salience of fault in organizing the two-track model of habeas. Nevertheless, in the absence of more secure evidence, I will offer a
hypothesis. A dominant characteristic of the American criminal
justice system since the 1970s has been its engorging volume.297
Between 1972 and 2012, the US prison population grew by 705
percent.298 Whereas “[i]n the early 1980s most state felony offenders served, on average, sixteen to seventeen months,” by
2006 the “average felony sentence in state court exceeded four
years.”299 This development is unmatched in other industrialized

AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32
Seattle U L Rev 595, 598–601 (2009).
295 Filarsky v Delia, 132 S Ct 1657, 1661–62 (2012) (citation omitted).
296 See Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs
59–81 (Yale 1983). See also Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental
Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash L Rev 635, 638–40 (1982) (extending the same
asymmetric-incentives argument to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
297 See generally Justice Policy Institute, The Punishing Decade: Prison and Jail
Estimates
at
the
Millennium
(May
2000),
online
at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/00-05_rep_punishingdecade_ac.pdf
(visited
Dec 3, 2013).
298 Pew Center on the States, Prison Count 2010: State Population Declines for the
First
Time
in
38
Years
*1
(Apr
2010),
online
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corr
ections/Prison_Count_2010.pdf (visited Dec 3, 2013).
299 Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 Hastings L J 423, 430 n 38
(2013).
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nations.300 It is a unique, and historically novel, political economy of mass incarceration.
Habeas provides no obvious solution for the pathologies of
mass incarceration because of the prevalence of plea bargaining
and the inability of many prisoners to access postconviction review before being released.301 But that does not mean mass incarceration has no effect on federal postconviction institutions.
Rather, the new political economy of penality imposes two
strains on federal postconviction relief that together yield a vicelike squeeze. First, increases in the numbers of prisoners serving sentences long enough to enable them to seek habeas relief
seems to have outpaced the ability of federal courts to maintain
the same quality and quantity of per capita attention. As a result, resource constraints pinch with increasing vigor over time.
Second, the growing volume of criminal defendants—many indigent302—has not been accompanied by growing fiscal commitments to effective representation. To the contrary, overwhelming evidence suggests that fiscal provision for indigent-defense
counsel has failed to keep up with demand.303 Hence, the dynamic that dilutes the capacity of the federal courts to give individualized attention to constitutional violations in discrete cases also
increases the frequency of Sixth Amendment violations. Demand
for postconviction relief correspondingly inflates as supply
dwindles.
The increased cost of searching for and identifying errors—
to say nothing of the political costs of granting relief—places
immense new strains on the federal judiciary. There is much
greater pressure to tolerate a lower threshold of effective counsel
lest the number of successful constitutional challenges prove ei-

300 See Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Ninth Edition) *1 (International Centre for Prison Studies July 2011), online at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf (visited Dec 3, 2013) (“The United States has
the highest prison population rate in the world, 743 per 100,000.”); Marc Mauer, Race to
Incarcerate 15–20, figs 2-1, 2-2 (New Press 1999).
301 See Traum, 64 Hastings L J at 446–47 (cited in note 299)
302 A Department of Justice study found that 82 percent of those charged with a felony offence in large state courts received appointed counsel by the end of their case. See
Caroline Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases *1 (US Department of Justice
Nov 2000), online at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (visited Dec 3, 2013).
Increasing income inequality means this figure is likely higher now. There is a tight bilateral causal relationship, moreover, between exposure to the criminal justice system
and poverty. See Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America 11–33 (Russell
Sage Foundation 2006).
303 See note 6.
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ther systemically burdensome or politically unsustainable. The
overload also inculcates skepticism: “He who must search a haystack for a needle,” noted Justice Jackson long ago, “is likely to
end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the
search.”304 Over time though, the haystack has taken on dimensions Jackson could hardly have conjured.
Conservative or liberal, justices sitting in the apex court
may well be aware of the acute systemic pressures these countervailing forces impose on the federal judiciary. Conservative or
liberal, justices’ motivations likely “are shaped in part by a
sense of institutional duty.”305 If this hypothesis of institutional
identification is plausible, it may be that justices of all ideological stripes perceive a need to converge on some tool for rationing
habeas in an era of waxing demand and waning supply. My hypothesis is that fault has played that role. Fault, as a concept
drawn from corrective justice, provides an implicit intellectual
framework that is, at least on its face, somewhat orthogonal to
otherwise powerful liberal and conservative policy preferences
about the states’ criminal justice systems.306 Reliance on a concept of fault obscures the extent to which it is the federal judiciary’s institutional compulsions that are driving the narrowing
gyre of habeas relief notwithstanding the eroding institutions of
state criminal justice administration.307 It also borrows from an
area of law, constitutional tort, perceived as contiguous to habeas, and hence ripe for doctrinal transplantation.308 Fault therefore provides a useful focal point for channeling concerns about
institutional overload into doctrinal limits on habeas relief.

304

Brown v Allen, 344 US 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson concurring).
Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 Am Polit Sci Rev 321, 323 (2007).
306 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U Toronto L J 349,
349 (2002) (“Corrective justice is the idea that liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by
one person on another.”). This formulation leaves open the degree of fault required to
trigger a duty of rectification—which, of course, is the battlefield on which the scope of
modern habeas is decided.
307 Conversely, however, expansions of federal judicial power are “effected by acts of
Congress.” Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development 273 (Princeton 2012). The distinctive, asymmetrical politics of jurisdictional expansion and contraction is an interesting topic that warrants its own separate treatment beyond my scope here.
308 See Joseph L. Hoffmann and William J. Stuntz, Habeas after the Revolution,
1993 S Ct Rev 65, 66 (“Habeas issues have thus been seen as ‘of a kind’ with issues that
arise in Section 1983 litigation, the immunity of state governments and officials, Younger v Harris abstention, and the Eleventh Amendment.”).
305
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But this is not to say that fault concepts are not always uncontroversial among the Justices, or that convergence on a fault
standard precludes ideologically tinged disagreement. When the
Court began importing inchoate versions of the fault concept into habeas jurisprudence in the late 1970s in cases such as
Wainwright v Sykes,309 fault was a divisive conceptual borrowing.310 Judicial restriction of habeas relief then reflected the
same dynamics of conservative political pressure that were catalyzing the Court’s larger punitive turn in criminal justice.311
The ideological consensus on fault that I have posited
emerges somewhat later, at a time at which the docket pressures instigated by mass incarceration were becoming clearer.
By the time the two-track model of habeas had developed, moreover, fault had also crystallized as the dominant lodestar in the
constitutional tort context.312 It was only more slowly, with the
numbing caress of time’s passage, that fault filtered into habeas
jurisprudence’s mainstream, and then calcified as an intellectual
touchstone that could transcend ideological divisions in order to
resolve, at least on the surface, the rationing problem fostered
by mass incarceration. Of course, agreement on a general principle of fault, at least as defined as egregious noncompliance
with standing rules or norms, does not preclude sharp, ideological differences on doctrinal mechanics. Nevertheless, the vocabulary and conceptual baggage of fault might be not only a point of
consensus, but also an arena for contestation and debate using a
shared, nonideological vocabulary.

309

433 US 72 (1977).
Compare the concurring opinion of Justice Burger, id at 92–94 (placing consequences of attorney error on defendant), with Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion, id at
105 (arguing that a lawyer’s error should not result in a “forfeiture of constitutional
rights”).
311 Empirical work by Katherine Beckett demonstrates that shifting public and political attitudes toward crime from the 1960s onward were consequences of “the definitional activities of state actors and the mass media”—beginning with Barry Goldwater’s
campaign focus on street crime—rather than a response to increasing levels of criminality. Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use in American Politics, 41 Soc Probs 425, 426–27 (1994). See generally Katherine Beckett, Making
Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (Oxford 1997). Neither
Beckett’s article nor her book, both of which are otherwise insightful and rewarding, address the role of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts. But it seems plausible to posit that
those bodies are among the “state actors” that kindled newly punitive public attitudes.
312 See Jeffries, 99 Va L Rev at 250–58 (cited in note 30) (recounting doctrinal development). The earliest uses of fault in constitutional tort doctrine predate Sykes. See, for
example, Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 322 (1975).
310
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One might hence gloss the debates about the state’s culpability in Martinez and Trevino, or the appropriate demand on
defense counsel in Maples and Holland, as part of an ongoing
contestation over the meaning of fault. That the Court can continue these debates within the delimited vocabulary of fault
suggests that the latter concept at present succeeds in providing
a bridge across otherwise recalcitrant ideological divides—a
common ground on which to pursue and divide over when selfserving institutional interests should trump the federal courts’
care for constitutional entitlement.
This hypothesis, alas, may want for many testable predictions any time soon. One exception, though, concerns the extension of the Martinez rule to issues other than the Sixth Amendment’s promise of effective assistance of counsel. For example, in
October 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Martinez does not extend to claims that the state failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v Maryland,313 albeit
over a powerful dissent by Judge Fletcher.314 Yet the overall
fault-oriented structure of habeas jurisprudence suggests that
Brady claims are an even stronger candidate for exculpating
cause than Strickland claims. Unlike the latter, assertions of deliberate nondisclosure surely warrant the extension of Martinez.
Zooming out, the picture may be less amenable to interpretation. Recent years have witnessed a slight dip in national incarceration rates.315 It is thus possible that the conditions that
produced two-track habeas will recede within the imaginable future. But there is no reason to think that the two-track model of
habeas will deliquesce in lockstep. Doctrinal and analytic structures can outlive their precipitating causes as a result of institutional inertia and path-dependency dynamics.316 These are exacerbated in the judicial context by the institutional habit of stare
decisis. Even absent its natal conditions, therefore, a bifurcated

313

373 US 83 (1963).
See Hunton v Sinclair, 2013 WL 5583975, *1 (9th Cir). See also Hodges v Colson,
727 F3d 517, 540 (6th Cir 2013) (intimating that Martinez and Trevino do not extend
beyond the Sixth Amendment context).
315 Lauren E. Glaze and Erika Parks, Correctional Populations in the United States,
2011
*1
(US
Department
of
Justice
Nov
12,
2012),
online
at
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus11.pdf (visited Dec 3, 2013) (noting a three-year decline
in the correctional population).
316 See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis 17–
18 (Princeton 2004).
314
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system of habeas may endure as a stable “jurisprudential regime” for years to come.317
E. Summary
It is tempting to write off the Roberts Court’s approach to
habeas cases as merely another instance of the diffuse, reflective
judicial hostility toward criminal defendants that has infused
the apex tribunal’s jurisprudence since the Burger Court.318 The
temptation, though, should be resisted. The transformation of
habeas into its current bifurcated structure is the work not of an
ideologically coherent coalition of justices, but of ideologically
heterogeneous supermajorities. Accordingly, it is necessary to
seek an explanation that works across ideological lines. Federalism, I have suggested, is a poor candidate in this regard. Instead, I have developed three potential explanations of two-track
habeas, and suggested that one matches observed outcomes better than the others. First, habeas does not function well as a
sorting mechanism notwithstanding the obvious screening effects it has. Second, the two-track model of habeas is poorly explained in terms of its incentive effects on state court actors.
Functionalist explanations, that is, fall short.
Instead, perhaps the most promising explanation of twotrack habeas centers on the concept of fault. The doctrine selects
for a narrow class of cases in which there is an exceptional
asymmetry between the blameworthiness of the petitioner and
the blameworthiness of the state. In Track One, petitioners prevail by demonstrating exceptional state fault; in Track Two,
they prevail by showing their own extraordinary blamelessness.
This normative economy of habeas relief, I have suggested, is
perhaps best understood as a way of titrating habeas relief in an
era of massive docket pressures.
III. THE AGENDAS OF HABEAS REFORM
Postconviction habeas scholarship today, by and large, assumes there is merit in reform, and then debates what direction
317 Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 305, 308 (2002) (defining “jurisprudential
regime” as “a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, that structures the way in
which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key elements of cases in arriving at decisions
in a particular legal area”).
318 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich L Rev 2466, 2467–68 & nn 5–12 (1996).
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such reform should take. That debate, however, has occurred in
the absence of any serious accounting of current doctrinal formations of the sort offered in Part II. In effect, reformist scholarship takes the remedial scarcity of habeas as a given, skips
over the doctrinal predicates of such scarcity, and then offers reform proposals that account neither for the causal forces that
have shaped the doctrine nor the policy aims it promotes. There
is, in consequence, a touch of Hamlet without the prince: Scholars give no reason to take the doctrinal status quo as a given,
and yet do. Rather than asking what habeas is for, or what it
ought to be, they ask what habeas can be in light of the transient political preferences of the day.
This Part breaks from the consensus approach in the scholarship by considering the implications of the two-track model
and its fault-based logic for one leading habeas reform proposal,
which has been eloquently advanced by Professors Joseph Hoffmann and Nancy King. I focus on their position not because it is
new—in important ways it largely echoes positions taken by
leading habeas commentators such as Judge Henry Friendly
and Professor Paul Bator—but because it is the most eloquent
and cogent formulation among the recent calls to restrictively
reimagine habeas. Taking doctrine seriously, I suggest, demonstrates the fragility of their proposals. Rather than adding to the
overstuffed catalog of ambitious reform proposals likely to gather dust on law library shelves, I offer instead some reasons to
think that the two-track model of habeas as it now exists can be
useful as an instrument within a project of reforming larger
criminal law institutions in ways that improve social welfare.
In this final section of the Article, I should flag here, I move
from the descriptive to the normative. I identify the possibility of
larger criminal justice reform with the potential for net social
welfare gains. By positing a connection between habeas and a
larger reformist project, I plainly endorse the desirability of that
project. Readers should therefore beware that this last section
reflects my own normative views to an extent that the Article
until now has not.
A. The Limits of Habeas Reform
In a trenchantly argued article and book, Joseph Hoffmann
and Nancy King have developed a powerful and radical reformist position. Building on Professor King’s impressive 2009 empirical study of federal habeas litigation, they predict that “habeas
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will . . . be inaccessible to the vast majority of state criminal defendants” because of plea-bargained waivers and short sentences, and that even for prisoners with access to federal collateral
review, the inadequate development of claims in state court will
doom them to procedural default.319 Taking this bleak landscape
as a given—and without considering whether a different standard of relief or more generous evidentiary rule might change
outcomes320—Hoffmann and King conclude that noncapital habeas should be scrapped except for “clear and convincing” claims
of actual innocence and new constitutional rules made retroactive on retroactive review.321 “Whatever can be saved by cutting
back on habeas review,” they suggest, should be allocated to
funding indigent defense.322
Comparison with the two-track model of habeas brings into
focus an important set of puzzles about the Hoffmann-King proposal.323 I have argued that the two-track model of habeas is best
understood as a means of rationing federal-court time and labor
in a fashion that cuts across ideological lines. In effect, what
Hoffmann and King propose is simply a new rationing device.
Under their proposal, scarce federal judicial attention and remedial power would be channeled toward cases of actual innocence rather than according to concepts of fault. Their proposal,
therefore, has strong normative appeal to the extent that actual
innocence is a more compelling trigger for habeas relief than
fault. It also has an appealing political logic, insofar as it mitigates habeas’s image problem as a device that avails the cunning, not the worthy.324
Yet once it is apparent that the central problem habeas
must solve is one of rationing—and that two-track habeas is al-

319

Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 814 (cited in note 7).
I am skeptical that this assumption is a defensible one. Given the large body of
evidence demonstrating pervasive constitutional violations in state criminal justice systems, I am dubious that the currently stringent rules for titrating habeas relief should be
taken for granted. A fortiori, I am highly skeptical that it is appropriate to conclude that
the low rate of relief (which is endogenous to those legal standards) is a justification for
abolition of most habeas relief.
321 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 820–21 (cited in note 7).
322 Id at 823–33.
323 For persuasive criticism of this proposal, see generally Primus, Review, 110 Mich
L Rev at 887 (cited in note 10); Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 435
(cited in note 10); Lee Kovarsky, Review, Habeas Verité, 47 Tulsa L Rev 13 (2011). I do
repeat the powerful criticisms developed by these commentators, with which I am largely
in accord.
324 See text accompanying notes 215–217.
320

HABEAS HUQ SSRN (DO NOT DELETE)

176

The University of Chicago Law Review

3/7/2014 12:46 PM

[81:NNN

ready doing one sort of rationing—the Hoffmann-King proposal
begets perhaps more questions than answers. To begin with, two
of the reasons Hoffmann and King adduce for the disutility of
federal habeas themselves mitigate the rationing problem. Abbreviating sentences and securing validly bargained-for waivers
may constitute ways of winnowing the pool of state defendants
down to a subpopulation that will benefit most from habeas review.325 Assuming, however, that such winnowing through
changed sentencing practice proves insufficient, then Hoffmann
and King’s argument boils down to taking for granted the cohort
of procedural bars to habeas consideration that preclude relief in
most cases and refusing to consider whether any should be relaxed or changed. In harmony with this strategy, King has argued in recent work that Martinez (and, presumably, related
Track Two cases) will make little difference.326
To begin with, it is not clear why the two-track model of habeas should be accepted as a given, or accepted as entrenched
beyond modification. After all, it is not the work of Congress, but
that of a transient group of federal judges. It is also hardly beyond reproach. To the contrary, as Part II demonstrated, the
two-track model fails to further central functions of an effective
postconviction review system—preventing serious constitutional
error, freeing the innocent, and creating desirable incentives for
state actors. Instead, it sits on an arbitraged notion of corrective
justice morality that fits awkwardly with the history and purposes of the habeas writ. There are ample ways in which scholars and commentators can (and do) argue for mitigating reforms.
Indeed, recent Track Two case law demonstrates that the
Court’s chosen vocabulary of fault allows for a surprising degree
of internal debate. Hoffmann and King supply no reason for
simply abandoning this doctrinally oriented reformist project, or
for thinking that its expected payoffs are substantially less than
the costly and risky alternative they propose.
Alternatively, perhaps Hoffmann and King’s argument for
major reform relies on an implicit institutional comparison: it
might be that the Court is unlikely to change course on habeas,

325 Assuming, of course, defendants entering plea bargains have “good information”
enabling them to “rationally forecas[t] probabilities” of conviction and sentences. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer
Protection, 99 Cal L Rev 1117, 1126 (2011). I leave aside the question whether further
reforms are warranted to assure that this condition is satisfied.
326 King, 122 Yale L J at 2449–55 (cited in note 99).
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while Congress might still enact reform if “extraordinary political commitment” were exerted.327 In effect Hoffmann and King
have given up on the Court and rest their hopes on Congress.
There are three problems with this notion. First, as Part I
showed, the two-track model—like much of habeas’s evolution—
is largely the Court’s work, not Congress’s. There is no reason to
expect the Justices to take a backseat now given the extent of its
historical control over the shape of habeas doctrine. Second,
there is also no clear reason to expect congressional action of the
sort Hoffmann and King propose. Of late, Congress’s inability to
fulfill even basic functions necessary to sustain the national
public good has been painfully clear. But even putting the 2013
debt ceiling and government shutdowns aside, there is scant
reason to expect Congress to move more rapidly than the courts.
Empirical work comparing the ideal points of Congress and Supreme Court along a common metric finds little gap between
those two institutions.328 The increasingly conservative cast of
the House of Representatives since 2007 and growing legislative
gridlock make Hoffmann and King’s optimism about Congress
less than obviously plausible—and this is so even before one accounts for the possibility of future judicial appointments leaning
to the liberal side.329
Finally, even if Congress were to act, the fiscal tradeoff
Hoffmann and King propose is implausible and unsustainable.
Although they do not quantify the cost savings of their proposed
pruning of habeas,330 it is implausible to think that the marginal
reduction in the federal budget from trimming 6.77 percent of
the federal court docket will be substantial. For one thing, most
of the federal courts’ operating costs are fixed, not variable.
Shaving off even one twentieth of the docket is unlikely to make
much difference. Without changing fixed costs (of operating
327 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 833 (cited in note 7). They also seem to
assume that any proposal must be revenue-neutral to be feasible.
328 See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates across Time and Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 Am J Polit Sci 433, 444 (2007) (presenting historical data about presidential, congressional, and judicial preferences).
329 See Dashiell Bennett, Do-Nothing Congress Somehow Manages to Do Even Less,
The
Atlantic
Wire
*1
(The
Atlantic
July
1,
2013),
online
at
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/do-nothing-congress-somehow-managesdo-even-less/66739/ (visited Dec 3, 2013) (“The 112th Congress . . . passed 220 laws, the
fewest of any Congress [for which statistics are available]. . . . [S]ix months into its term
the 113th Congress is actually on pace to pass even fewer laws than that.”).
330 See Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 468 (cited in note 10)
(making this complaint).
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courthouses, paying salaries, running the judiciary’s administrative structure, and the like) substantial cost savings will in all
probability prove a mirage. Stated otherwise, Hoffmann and
King implicitly inflate the marginal fiscal benefit of streamlining habeas, when a fairer assessment would undermine their
normative claims and proposed reforms. Moreover, their counterproposal is not politically sustainable. Hoffmann and King
propose a funding stream to replace a general-purpose institution. Funding streams must be reappropriated each year. They
are vulnerable to diminishment each year. Hostage to legislative
fortune in an era of relentless pressure toward austerity, Hoffmann and King’s proposed funding would likely prove far more
fragile than current habeas entitlements, which are bundled into institutional spending packages and hence less vulnerable to
erosion.
But there is an even more serious problem with the proposed rehabilitation of noncapital habeas: two-track habeas currently manages the rationing problem, arguably with some decree of injustice but with no obvious systemic failures. By
contrast, Hoffmann and King’s alternative to the current deployment of fault as a rationing mechanism is likely to fail, producing systemic difficulties for the judiciary. To see this, notice
their call for an innocence-centered writ is rather old hat.331 And
Hoffmann and King do not say anything convincingly about why
that call has for so long been ignored. An obvious explanation is
readily at hand. However normatively compelling it is, innocence cannot serve as an effectual rationing mechanism for federal habeas in the way that fault can and does. As Professor Eve
Brensike Primus has observed, an innocence standard would not
diminish the volume of habeas petitions filed in federal court.332
Instead, suits presently framed around the Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel would be repackaged as actual innocence suits. This transmigration of claims across legal forms
would be worse than futile. It would raise the per capita cost of
resolving cases by replacing legal inquiries into procedural compliance with “resource-intensive” questions about factual innocence.333 Stated in terms of the signaling theory deployed in Part
II, an actual innocence threshold for relief will not create a sepa331

See, for example, Friendly, 38 U Chi L Rev at 142–43 (cited in note 181).
Primus, Review, 110 Mich L Rev at 902–03 (cited in note 10).
333 Id at 904. See also Blume, Johnson, and Weyble, 96 Cornell L Rev at 460 (cited
in note 10).
332
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rating equilibrium.334 Both meritorious and meritless petitioners
will file petitions asserting superficially colorable innocence
claims. Rather than separating different classes of petitioners,
an actual innocence rule would likely create a pooling equilibrium. The administrative costs of adjudicating habeas would rise
sharply, provoking the systemic problem that habeas doctrine,
at its core, is designed to mitigate.
Finally, whereas the fault-based framework for habeas is
likely to be relatively stable, an innocence-based one is unlikely
to prove a durable equilibrium. The evolution of two-track habeas hints at likely judicial responses to the pooling equilibrium
that Hoffmann and King’s proposal would engender: By hook or
by crook, the Court will construe the habeas statute to manage
the ensuing toll on judges’ human capital. The long-term consequence of Hoffmann and King’s proposal, in short, is likely to be
even greater narrowing of the criteria for relief, albeit without
any necessary decrease in the volume or cost of postconviction
litigation. In comparison to this outcome, the two-track model
employed at present may indeed appear attractive.
B. Two-Track Habeas and the Reform of Criminal Justice
Institutions
Perhaps, though, habeas reform should not be isolated from
the larger context of criminal justice administration. Notwithstanding its mention in the Constitution, habeas is not a good in
itself. It is an institutional feature that enables other valuable
human ends (in particular, individual liberty from unlawful or
unjust government confinement) to be realized. In concluding, I
develop the possibility that our unreformed two-track habeas
can play a role in stimulating reform in the criminal justice institutions engendered by the usually punitive political economy
of the past half-century. Perhaps, that is, it is not necessary to
destroy habeas in order to redeem it. Rather, it is desirable to
think about how the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, even in the
straitened terms set out by the Roberts Court, fits into larger
processes of social and institutional change beyond the courts.
The role of habeas is not a direct one. Hoffmann and King
are surely correct that postconviction habeas is no panacea to

334

See text accompanying notes 179–190.
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criminal law institutions’ dysfunctionalities.335 Federal habeas is
largely irrelevant, for example, to systems of misdemeanor prosecutions that comprise more than three-quarters of state criminal justice dockets.336 Further, federal courts evince little appetite for institutional reform. Twice in recent years, the Court has
confronted non-habeas cases starkly presenting dysfunctionalities in state criminal justice institutions. Both times, the Court
ducked substantive judgments about the state’s conduct. In Boyer v Louisiana,337 the Court confronted a challenge to Louisiana’s
woefully underfunded indigent-defense funding system.338 Although formally a Sixth Amendment speedy trial case, Boyer’s
certiorari petition presented an opportunity for the Court to
speak directly to the underlying funding crisis in indigent defense in the context of especially compelling facts. Instead, the
Court issued a per curiam opinion (over a sharp dissent from
Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) dismissing
the case on the basis of a factual finding starkly at odds with the
lower court’s conclusions.339 In Connick v Thompson,340 the same
five-Justice majority overturned a damages award against a
New Orleans prosecutor’s office that had withheld exculpatory
evidence in capital proceedings.341 The Thompson ruling rejected
the jury’s finding of municipal liability on the factual ground—
sharply contested by Justice Ginsburg in dissent—that the

335 Hoffmann and King, 84 NYU L Rev at 810–14 (cited in note 7). But see Primus,
98 Cal L Rev at 32–33 (cited in note 5) (arguing that habeas should be reformed as a
structural remedy by requiring petitioners not just to show a discrete constitutional violation in their case, but also “evidence of a systemic violation of a constitutional right”).
336 Robert C. LaFountain, et al, Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of
2010 State Court Caseloads *24 (National Center for State Courts Dec 2012), online at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx (visited Dec 3, 2013)
(showing breakdown of criminal case type in 17 states). See also Alexandra Natapoff,
Misdemeanors, 85 S Cal L Rev 1313, 1316 (2012) (identifying high rates of wrongful
misdemeanor convictions).
337 133 S Ct 1702 (2013) (per curiam).
338 Id (Alito concurring). See generally M. Isabel Medina, Reforming Criminal Indigent Defense in Louisiana—An Introduction to the Symposium and a Brief Exploration
of Criminal Indigent Defense and Its Relationship to Immigrant Indigent Defense, 9
Loyola J Pub Int L 111 (2008) (documenting problems in Louisiana’s indigent-defense
system).
339 Boyer, 133 S Ct at 1704, 1706 (Sotomayor dissenting) (noting that the Court was
acting inconsistently with the state court’s finding that most of the delay was caused by
the unavailability of funds for the defenses).
340 131 S Ct 1350 (2011).
341 Id at 1355–56.

HABEAS HUQ SSRN (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

Habeas and the Roberts Court

3/7/2014 12:46 PM

181

plaintiff had not shown a sufficient pattern of misconduct.342
Even in the teeth of strong evidence of systemic breakdowns in
criminal justice, that is, the Court tends to blink even without
the blinding optics of habeas.
Perhaps, though, it is too much to ask courts to address institutional pathologies of the kind at work in Boyer head-on.
Scholars have long rehearsed the limits of judicial reform capacity, and counseled for chastened expectations on that front.343
But there is an alternative. Court decisions, however, can still
provide both focal points and catalysts for larger processes of social and political movements. Supreme Court opinions, even if
not effectual directly, can still generate “a political symbol that
might assist others in the organizing, demanding, and resisting
that is the stuff of oppositional politics.”344 A nascent literature
on the Supreme Court’s national agenda-setting role finds that
at least some opinions indeed have an enduring “step effect,”
amplifying media attention on issues that would otherwise remain trapped in news epicycles.345 In this indirect way, judicial
rulings can open pathways to beneficial social change.
Habeas review arguably might still play these coordinating
and catalyzing roles in respect to a larger project of criminal justice reform, even when it fails to supply individual relief.346 This
342 Id at 1360. See also id at 1370–75 (Ginsburg dissenting). The Thompson Court’s
gimlet-eyed approach to evaluations of systemic constitutional violations suggests that
Primus’s proposal to raise the stakes of discrete habeas action by making each one systemic in scope is at least perilous. Rather than catalyzing reform, federal courts might be
unwilling to make politically contentious findings of systemic harm and therefore even
more inclined to deny habeas relief to individuals. For another 42 USC § 1983 case in
which the Court declined to explore the existence of a systemic failure, see Van de Kamp
v Goldstein, 129 S Ct 855, 861–62 (2009) (holding that prosecutors “involved in [ ] supervision or training or information-system management enjoy absolute immunity” from
certain constitutional tort claims).
343 For the leading works on this subject, see generally Michael J. Klarman, From
Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford 2004); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (Chicago 2d ed 2008).
344 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev 673, 746 (1992).
345 Roy B. Flemming, John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood, One Voice Among Many: The
Supreme Court’s Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947–92, 41
Am J Polit Sci 1224, 1234 (1997). See also Roy B. Flemming, B. Dan Wood, and John
Bohte, Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of
American Policy Agendas, 61 J Polit 76, 92 (1999).
346 In their book, King and Hoffmann argue that habeas “helps to restore the balance of powers on which our divided government rests,” using the Guantánamo detentions as a case study. See King and Hoffmann, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century at
47 (cited in note 7). Elsewhere, I have argued that this optimistic reading of Guantánamo-related habeas litigation is belied by the empirical evidence of case outcomes and de-
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possibility arises solely because of a sudden—and, to many observers, unexpected—pivot in public and political sentiment regarding crime and punishment. The pivot is evident both in
terms of criminal justice outcome and in terms of observed policy
shifts. To begin with, after many years of persistent increase,
national incarceration rates have begun to stagnate. In 2009, for
the first time in three decades, the number of individuals under
correctional supervision fell.347 Many states, including California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Texas, and Virginia,
have also slowed or halted prison construction.348 The thirteenfold increase in state spending on incarceration between 1977
and 2004 no longer seems as sustainable as it once did.349 Criminal laws are also becoming less punitive. Two changes at the
federal level can serve as illustrations: In 2008, Congress enacted the Second Chance Act, supporting state-level reentry and reintegration efforts.350 In 2010, it partially mitigated the disparity
in sentencing consequences between crack and powder cocaine
crimes.351 In 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that
federal prosecutors would no longer list quantities of illegal narcotics in indictments for certain low-level drug cases, a move

tention rates. See Huq, 26 Const Commen at 402–03 (cited in note 24). In addition the
idea of “balance” in constitutional design is beset by well-known and insuperable conceptual difficulties that King and Hoffmann simply blink. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 Cal L Rev 887, 929–44 (2012); M. Elizabeth
Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 Va L Rev 1127, 1155–57
(2000). The net result of their analysis is a repudiation of a concrete liberty value universally recognized as central to social welfare in favor of an alluring but ultimately inchoate and perhaps even incoherent, structural concept.
347 Pew Center on the States, Prison Count 2010 at *1 (cited in note 298). (Apr
2010),
online
at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corr
ections/Prison_Count_2010.pdf (visited Dec 3, 2013).
348 See Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process
Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders 6 (Oxford 2009).
349 See John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U Chi Legal F 73,
76–77 (2010) (“States spent a total of $2.8 billion on corrections in 1977 and $39.3 billion
in 2004; this represents a thirteen-fold increase in nominal dollars and a four-and-halffold increase in real dollars (although per-prisoner expenditures have actually declined
slightly in real terms).”).
350 Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub L No 110-199, 122 Stat 657 (2008).
351 See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub L No 111-220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010), codified at 28 USC § 841(b)(1) (reducing the disparity between crack and powder cocaine
penalties from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1).
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that would sidestep the triggering of long mandatory minimum
sentences.352
Quite what caused this unexpected ebbing of the undertow
in American punitiveness is currently hard to discern with certainty. Crack-related violence is less salient than it once was.
States and localities are under growing fiscal pressures due to
the 2008 financial crisis and crystallizing concerns about incipient pension liabilities. Perhaps a certain style of politics that fed
on crime-related fears has become less palatable.353 Regardless
of its causes, at least one of its consequences is clear: the Supreme Court’s typically punitive attitude to crime and criminals
seems now sharply out of step with contemporary political pressures. Justices appointed by presidents who made crime control
a central talking point354 are no longer vocalizing a wider political zeitgeist.
In this new context, the Court’s interventions on criminal
justice matters may stand a chance of catalyzing or sustaining a
shift away from a costly, punitive approach to criminal justice,
in favor of a more tempered modality in which convictions and
sentences are not pursued at any collateral costs. No doubt the
Justices will never play a sole leadership role in this effort. But
it has long been understood that the Court can and does play a
tutelary role in national public debates.355 Habeas—by drawing
attention in a dramatic and specific fashion to particular pathologies in the criminal justice system—may be an important ele352 Eric Holder, Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates, (US Department of Justice Aug 12, 2013), online at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech130812.html (visited Dec 3, 2013).
353 One leading study attributes American punitiveness to “the belief that those disproportionately subject to [ ] harsh sanctions are people they do not like: African American offenders.” James D. Unnever and Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing Models, 48 Criminol 99, 119 (2010).
Whether this race-oriented thinking has shifted of late—perhaps with installation of an
African-American in the White House—is a large and difficult question that lies far beyond my remit here.
354 For President Nixon, see Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union, 1970 Pub Papers 8, 12 (declaring a war on crime). For Presidents Reagan and
George H.W. Bush, see Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U Chi Legal F
25, 70 (1994). It would be misleading to suggest that Democratic presidents have not
shared this rhetoric. See William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20 U Dayton L Rev 567, 568 (1995)
(signing a harsh crime bill and remarking that “[t]here must be no doubt about whose
side we’re on”).
355 This has been so since the early days of the Republic. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 S Ct Rev 127, 177–80.
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ment of this judicial role. And the fault-based framework of twotrack habeas arguably channels judicial attention toward a subset of cases most likely to have the largest long-term impact. Indeed, given the sheer volume of habeas petitions, neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts would be able to
play this role at all without the triaging provided by the twotrack model.
Habeas thus matters to any larger project of criminal justice
reform not only because the sheer cost of habeas litigation likely
has a frictional effect on the punitiveness of state criminal
law.356 Even in these early days of the Roberts Court’s bifurcated
approach to habeas, there is some evidence that the Court is
able and willing to play a supporting role in the larger project of
criminal justice reform. Three recent examples from cases on
both Track One and Track Two serve to demonstrate the point.
The first is the unanticipated spate of Track Two cases from
Martinez and Maples to Trevino that have underscored the architectonic role that effective assistance of counsel might be
thought to play in a well-tempered criminal justice system. Even
if courts resist frontal confrontation with the underfinanced realities of indigent defense in Boyer and serial prosecutorial misconduct in Connick, they are nonetheless capable of indirectly
narrating compelling stories of how failures of counsel compromise broadly shared criminal justice goals. Hence, in Maples v
Thomas, Justice Ginsburg strategically situated the attorney error in that case in the larger context of Alabama’s systemic failure to provide effective counsel in capital cases.357 Although
Ginsburg did not belabor the point, it was clear from her opinion
that the breakdown in Maples’s case ought not to be ranked as a
surprise. The implications for larger reform are clear for those
willing to see.358 Given the Court’s high profile in national affairs, such cases provide opportunities for advocates of criminal
justice reform to press their case in the teeth of a spasmodic and
sensation-filled news cycle. Opinions like Justice Ginsburg’s
provide a legitimating platform for advocates and legislators
356 See Louis Michael Seidman, Review, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?) Demise
of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L J 2281, 2314 (1998).
357 See Maples, 132 S Ct at 917–18.
358 See Carol S. Steiker, Raising the Bar: Maples v. Thomas and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, in Essays in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg *71, *73–74
(Harvard
Law
School
Feb
4,
2013),
online
at
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10582558/Steiker.pdf?sequence=1
(visited
Dec 3, 2013) (developing the larger implications of the Maples opinion).
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seeking to erode punitive and niggardly approaches to criminal
justice and indigent defense.
A second example concerns the Court’s role in national debates about capital punishment. Even aside from its elaboration
of new constitutional rules, interventions via habeas provide a
focal point for debate and mobilization on the death penalty.359
What might otherwise be a local event of interest solely to single-issue activists becomes national news through the operation
of federal habeas. The Court’s intervention to stay briefly the
execution of Troy Davis by the state of Georgia, for example,
though ultimately unavailing,360 generated a national and even
international debate.361 No doubt capital cases would generate
some attention even in the absence of habeas review,362 but the
Court’s participation via postconviction habeas underscores the
high moral stakes in play and also legitimatize wider condemnations (and, equally, defenses) of what otherwise might be a local
sensation.
On the other hand, there is a powerful potential counterargument to this point: it is also possible that concerns about capital punishment have come to pollute pervasively the Justices’
thinking about habeas, edging to the margins other serious concerns about more mundane noncapital criminal justice systems.
This elision arguably blinds the Court to the real stakes of habeas litigation and distorts its analysis by filtering it through
the emotive and polarizing lens of debates on the death penalty.363 Far better to detach habeas from the related, but conceptually distinct, question of capital punishment—as I have aimed to
do here.

359 See Timothy R. Johnson and Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 Am Polit Sci Rev 299, 304–07 (1998) (analyzing
capital punishment cases, and finding that the Court’s influence on public opinion is
greatest the first time the Court rules on an issue).
360 The Court exercised its original jurisdiction to remand Davis’s petition for an
evidentiary hearing. See In re Davis, 130 S Ct 1, 1 (2009). The district court and Eleventh Circuit ultimately denied relief. See Davis v Terry, 625 F3d 716, 719 (11th Cir
2010). Davis was executed on September 22, 2011.
361 See, for example, John Schwartz, In the Debate on Capital Punishment, Davis
Execution Offers Little Closure, NY Times A17 (Sept 23, 2011); Scott Sayare, In Europe,
a Chorus of Outrage Over a U.S. Execution, NY Times A13 (Sept 23, 2011).
362 See David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America’s Death Penalty in an Age of
Abolition 294–95 (Belknap 2010).
363 This might suggest that the project of larger criminal justice reform is best pursued when decoupled from debates about the death penalty.

HABEAS HUQ SSRN (DO NOT DELETE)

186

The University of Chicago Law Review

3/7/2014 12:46 PM

[81:NNN

Finally, sometimes individual cases can present facts so
striking their public resonance is unmistakeable. In 2011 the
Court issued one of its serial per curiam reversals of the Ninth
Circuit’s grants of habeas relief in a case involving a grandmother, Shirley Ree Smith, convicted in relation to her grandchild’s death from “shaken baby” syndrome.364 Smith’s case—and
the prospect of a clearly traumatized grandmother being punished for the death of a grandchild when her guilt was, to say
the least, under a cloud—occasioned national attention, which in
turn elicited a rare exercise of gubernatorial clemency by Jerry
Brown.365 Smith’s habeas petition may not have been directly
successful, but it again turned a local issue into a national one—
and arguably catalyzed relief through a political mechanism
that is otherwise moribund.366 It also shows how even a denial of
habeas relief can lead to localized reform. In all of these cases,
habeas at least presented a possible platform for social and political mobilization, even if the ensuing opportunities have been
taken up in only a patchwork and unsatisfying fashion.
To many, all this may seem the squeezing of sour lemonade
from withered lemons. It is very clear, after all, that the role of
habeas in any movement to transform criminal justice writ large
will be liminal rather than central. Others, however, may reflect
that the palette of instruments available to reformers of the
criminal justice system is not a large one to begin with, so that
reformers must seize on even the thinnest of wedges. Habeas
has the advantage of a long history and a constitutional pedigree. Although I have criticized the fault-based standard, I do
not rule out the possibility that fault is a sufficiently plastic
standard that it might allow the Court to play a more aggressive
role in policing criminal justice administration over time. Reformers may also note that habeas allows bottom-up percolation
of problems in state criminal justice institutions. In cases like
Holland and Maples, it ventriloquizes the most disdained and
least politically powerful among us. For all its flaws, postconvic364

Cavazos v Smith, 132 S Ct 2, 6–8 (2011).
Emily Bazelon, Jerry Brown Shows Mercy to Shirley Ree Smith: The Governor
Does the Right Thing in a Doubly Tragic Shaken Baby Case, Slate (Apr 6, 2012), online
at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2012/04/jerry_brown_pardons_shi
rley_ree_smith_in_an_old_sad_shaken_baby_case_.html (visited Nov 10, 2013).
366 See Michael Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency
and Its Structure, 89 Va L Rev 239, 251 (2003) (noting the decline in and infrequent use
of clemency from 1973 to 1999).
365
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tion review is thus a political rarity insofar as it allows prisoners
and their counsel to set an agenda on a national scale. Such review thereby can provide a vehicle for perceived local injustice to
reach and linger before national audiences. The value of such
symbols and platforms for organizing is hard to predict, and may
not be obvious contemporaneously.
To many, it will seem obvious that the benefits flowing from
a handful of Supreme Court cases do not warrant the costs involved in lower courts’ daily adjudications.367 Simple cost-benefit
analysis is difficult without complex comparative judgments
across different political toolkits, and recalcitrant predictive
judgments about the pathways of institutional change.368 By
keeping questions such as capital punishment and our ongoing
indigent-defense crisis in the public eye, it may nevertheless be
that habeas yields sufficient offsetting benefits within the larger
project of criminal justice reform to justify its marginal costs for
federal courts and state prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
Scholars have fallen out of love with habeas. Yet the Supreme Court still consumes a regular diet of postconviction cases. A consequence of academic disfavor has been that the Roberts Court’s body of habeas jurisprudence has gone unexamined.
Instead, scholars have leapt to the conclusion that doctrine is a
mere “charade” unworthy of attention. That assumption is untenable.
The central descriptive aim of this Article has been to
demonstrate the surprising internal coherence of the Roberts
Court’s postconviction doctrine. Bifurcated into two distinct
tracks, that structure operates as a mechanism for titrating both
the quality of scrutiny petitions receives and for rationing the
thimbles of habeas relief now granted. My second goal has been
to analyze potential justifications for this two-track model of habeas. Rejecting functionalist explanations predicated on selection effects or feedback mechanisms, I have posited fault as an
organizing lodestar that has been borrowed from the constitutional tort context. To many, this will seem an unappealing, and
367 Although I am skeptical that the marginal fiscal cost of habeas is large. See text
accompanying notes 330–331.
368 See Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 Ann
Rev Polit Sci 369, 383 (1999) (describing studies that show how symbolic policies subsequently catalyze substantive shifts in policy).
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even irrelevant, central value. My aim here is not to defend per
se the role of fault, but simply to suggest that it has provided the
Justices with a needful tool for reconciling competing demands
of institutional capacity and equity. A deeper understanding of
the doctrinal architecture also helps illuminate the extant critiques of postconviction review and points the way toward a better conceptualization of the writ’s role in efforts to reform our
dysfunctional criminal justice systems.
Like Banquo’s ghost lingering at Macbeth’s banquet,369 postconviction habeas is an insistent reminder of unfinished business. In my judgment, it will not do simply to wash one’s hands
of that responsibility by pretending that our criminal justice system is in good repair or by imaging that the national political
process is in good repair and will eventually supply a full measure of responsive change. These are illusions best dispelled in
short order. On the other hand, I suspect that habeas will prove
as recalcitrant, as obdurate, as Banquo’s specter given the continuing absence of any plausible alternative mechanism for rationing judicial labor. Hard to banish, postconviction habeas in
all its somewhat baroque doctrinal glory warrants continued attention, and not the disdain that to date it has received.

369

See William Shakespeare, Macbeth Act III, Scene IV (American Book 1904).
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